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INTRODUCTION

T

he Apology of Apuleius, the speech which he gave when on trial for magic ca. a.d. 158, is an acknowledged literary masterpiece and deserves more study than it has received. In the speech, of
course, he attempts to establish his innocence of the charge. Scholars are almost unanimously agreed that he succeeded and was declared “insons.”
It was probably inevitable, however, that someone should have
attempted to show that Apuleius was actually guilty of magical practices, and that his Apology is not triumphant, but “nervous,” “nimble,”
and “evasive.”1 The attempt, curiously enough, has succeeded and
is now, almost by default, the reigning interpretation of the Apology. Indeed, in the last sixty years, only one scholar, B. Falciatore, has
attempted to show that Apuleius was really innocent.2 Falciatore’s
book has been so thoroughly ignored that the latest dissertation on
the Apology does not even list it under “works consulted.” 3
On the other hand, Adam Abt, in his dissertation, attempted to
show that “Alle Anklagepunkten haben ihren gute Sinn,” and that, if
Apuleius was acquitted, he owed it to his “ﬂicke Zunge” and not to
his innocence.4 Paul Vallette, who published his dissertation almost
simultaneously, tried to prove “que les explications d’Apulée ne sont
1 The speech is called “nervous” by J. M. Kelly, Roman Litigation, Oxford, 1966,
p. 54; “nimble” (ﬂicke) by Adam Abt, Die Apologie des Apuleius von Madaura und die
antike Zauberei, Giessen, 1908, p. 259, and “evasive” by Roger A. Pack, “The Adventures of a Dilettante in a Provincial Family,” CJ, 35 (1939), p. 78.
2 B. Falciatore, Nel

Mondo del la Magica; l’Orazione di Apuleio, Napoli, 1932.

3 Cecil

Paige Golann, The Life of Apuleius and his Connection with Magic, Princeton, 1951.
4 Abt, loc. cit.
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pas toujours entiérement convaincantes et que d’autre part, le philosophe tel qu’il le concoit est prèsque necessairement doublé d’un
magicien.”1 These two are now the basic works on the problem. Fritz
Norden, in his Apuleius von Madaura und das Römische Privatrecht,
devotes much of is ﬁrst ﬁfty-seven pages to a review of the Apology
in which he summarizes and enlarges upon the arguments of Abt
and Vallette. Victor Ussani acknowledges the validity of the latters’
conclusions.2 Roger A. Pack, following Norden, ﬁnds it “undeniable
that he had actually dabbled to some extent in the black arts,” and
ﬁnds the “evasiveness” of the defense “unmistakable.”3 C. P. Golann
reviews and enlarges upon the views of his predecessors to conclude:
“that his connection with magic may … have passed from passive
knowledge to active participation.”4
But the arguments used to show Apuleius a magician are all
analogies. Analogies do not prove. Apuleius, for instance, has occasion in the speech to use the word edulia, (“tidbits”). Abt found that
edulia were sometimes used in magic rites and did not blush to include even this in his evidence against Apuleius5—even though he
might himself have been snacking on an edulium while writing. Apuleius is known to have worshipped Mercury. Mercury’s domain included magic. This is the argument which the modern accusers of
1Paul Vallette, Apulée:

Apologie, Florides, Paris, 1922 (reprinted, 1960), p. xxii, n. 2.

2 “Magia, Misticismo

e Arte in Apuleio,” NAnt (1929), pp. 137–155.

3 Pack, loc. cit.
4

Op. cit., p. 156.
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Apuleius treat as their strongest: Vallette and Golann save it for last.
Pack uses it alone, and Golann terms it “highly convincing in regard
to Apuleius’ possible practice of magic.”1 I have discussed the problem in the appendix (pp. 100–106).
Almost everything could be used for magical purposes. Tools of
ancient magic were earth, air, ﬁre, and water.2 It is no coincidence
that these are the four ancient elements of which the universe was
constructed. Nor is it surprising that Abt was able to ﬁll a dissertation with the items which Apuleius mentions which were also used
with magical intent. Though the sheer number of items is impressive, Abt’s compilation proves, not that Apuleius was a magician, but
that desperate, would-be magicians had tried everything. The matter
of argumentation against Apuleius is summarized by Golann’s own
admission: “it must be stressed that the evidence in favor of Apuleius’ practice of magic is suggestive rather than direct.”3
The contribution of the present thesis will not be to search out
further magical parallels or to elaborate on those already known,
but to return to the evidence of the Apology itself. No one has ever
doubted that the core of the accusation against Apuleius (that he
used magic to win his wife) was false. No one seems to have pointed out the signiﬁcance of the fact that a false accusation was a serious crime. The penalty for the crime varied, but in the second century the tendency seems to have been to give the calumniator the
same penalty which he had tried to have inﬂicted upon his victim.
We have, for example, another instance of calumnia magiae within
thirty years of Apuleius’ trial. The calumniator was cruciﬁed.4 This
dissertation, then, will show evidence for an essentially new inter-

5 Op. cit., p. 136.

Apuleius uses the word edulia in dealing with the charge that
he has bought certain kinds of ﬁsh: “Why don’t you also argue against me from
several other purchases? For I have often bought bread and wine and fruits and
vegetables. Thus you decree famine for all food dealers, for who would dare buy
food from them if it were decided that all edulia which are purchased are intended,
not for dinner, but for magic.” (29.5–6) All translations in this dissertation are
mine, unless other wise noted. References to the Apology and to the Florida are to
the chapter and verse numbers of Vallette’s text.

1

Op. cit., p. 153.

2

Francois Ribadeau Dumas, L’Histoire de la Magie, Paris, n.d., pp. 69–70.

3 Op.
4 “In

cit., p. 153.

Sicilia [Severus] quasi de imperio vel vates vel Caldaeos consuluisset, reus
factus, sed a praefectis praetorianis, quibus audiendus datus fuerat, iam Commodo
in odio veniente, absolutus est, calumniatore in crucem acto” (H. A. Severus 2.3) .
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pretation of the Apology: that the only foundation for the accusation
against Apuleius was hatred and malice; that the accusers had so little faith in their charges that they had to be forced to make their accusation oﬃcial; that this was done by Apuleius, with the help of
the judge, so he could clear his name and expose his calumniatores;
in sum, that the innocent philosopher met the false accusation with
a de facto prosecution on the charge of calumnia as well as with a rebuttal of the charges of magic.
To support this interpretation, the present study will attempt to
show that there is no reason to doubt the evidence which Apuleius
presents in the Apology. It will then consider the origin of the trial,
and, ﬁnally, it will examine calumnia and Apuleius’ prosecution on
that charge throughout the Apology, topic by topic.

C HAPTER I

T HE E VENTS P RECEDING THE T RIAL

T

he series of events which culminated in the trial began some
sixteen years before it, with the death of Sicinius Amicus. He
left his two sons, Pontianus and Pudens, in the potestas of his father,
but his widow, Pudentilla, supported them, and remained single to
protect their interests (68. 2–3) Her father-in-law opposed this policy. Apparently wishing to keep her property in the family, he wanted
to have her marry another of his sons, Sicinius Clarus. He discouraged all other suitors, and threatened to disinherit her two sons if
she should marry anyone else. Thus constrained, she agreed to have
the marriage contract drawn up, but put oﬀ the marriage itself by
various ruses. Thus, at her father-in-law’s demise, she was still single,
but her sons duly inherited his property (68. inf.).
This left Pudentilla, now almost fourteen years a widow (68. 2)
and not yet forty (89), free to consider a second husband of her own
choosing. Somehow Sicinius Aemilianus still hoped she would marry his brother Clarus. Aemilianus sent Pontianus a letter asking that
he support the match. Unfortunately for his purpose, it is apparent
that he had no means of dispatching a letter to Rome, for he was
obliged to ask Pudentilla to have it sent (70. 4). It is a measure of
her prudence that she never sent it, but sent Pontianus a letter of
her own, mentioning her loneliness, and suggesting that Pontianus
was himself at the age where he ought to marry. She also mentioned
in this letter that the Sicinii brothers were still trying to have her
marry Sicinius Clarus (70. 2,5). Pontianus came straight home—his
grandfather’s bequest had been somewhat slender, and his right to a
share of his mother’s estate, valued at four million sesterces, was not
9
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Relationships of the Signiﬁcant Characters
Avus puerorum* (otherwise unnamed)

Sicinius
Clarus
(unsuccessful
suitor of
Pudentilla
after death
of Amicus)

Sicinius
Aemilianus
(accuser of
Apuleius)

Sicinius*
Amicus

Pudentilla

Apuleius

Herennius
Ruﬁnus
(accuser of
Apuleius)
Herennia

Claudius Maximus
(proconsul of Africa,
judge of the trial)
Cornelius
Saturninus
(prosecution
witness)

Pontianus*

Pudens (accuser
of Apuleius)

Tannonius Pudens
(advocate for the
prosecution)
Calpurnianus
(prosecution
witness)

*Deceased before the trial
10

Junius Crassus
(prosecution
witness)
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yet attested, but rested on an unwritten agreement (71. 5-7). It often happened that the wife’s property became entirely her husband’s,
and an avaricious step-father, he feared, would seriously jeopardize
his future (71. 5).
This was the situation when Apuleius, exhausted by a journey toward Alexandria, was obliged to stop and recover in Oea. He stayed
in bed several days in the home of his friends, the Appii, intending to resume his travels on recovery (72. 1-2). Pontianus had other plans for him. He had known Apuleius when both were in Athens, and had decided that the Platonic philosopher would make a
safe and suitable husband for his mother. Consequently, he called on
Apuleius, convinced him that he should not leave soon, but should
await the next winter before resuming his travels,1 and ﬁnally persuaded him to spend the interval at his mother’s house. Pontianus
then pleaded with the Appii to turn their guest over to him (72.
3-6).
Apuleius, recovered from his ailment, delivered a discourse “On
the Majesty of Aesculapius” in the local basilica. The oration was enthusiastically received—the crowd shouted an invitation to stay in
the town and become a citizen of Oea (73. 2). Pontianus took the
good will of the crowd as a divine and favoring omen, and broached
his plan for Apuleius’ marriage to his mother. He told Apuleius that,
of all those eligible, he was the only one whom he could trust to protect his interests (73. 3) . But Apuleius was still a bachelor at heart
(72. 5 and 73. 5), and was not completely persuaded until a full year
later (73. 7). Even then, he and Pudentilla (who might have been
won over at the start [73. 8]) decided to wait at least until Pontianus
should marry and Pudens should don the toga virilis.
Pontianus made an unfortunate choice. His intended bride was
the daughter of the infamous former actor, Herennius Ruﬁnus. Although Ruﬁnus’ father had bequeathed him three million sesterces
(which he had preserved by putting the sum in his wife’s name when
1 Winter seems to have been the most healthful time to traverse North Africa.
See below, p. 41.
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he declared bankruptcy [75. 5-8]), Ruﬁnus was now a ﬁnancial and
moral bankrupt whose income was largely derived from his wife’s
amorous adventures1 (75. passim).
But such an income could not continue forever:
Ceterum uxor iam propemodum vetula et eﬀeta totam domum contumeliis [lacuna] abnuit. Filia
autem per adulescentulos ditiores invitamento marris suae necquiquam circumlata, quibusdam etiam
procis ad experiundum permissa, nisi in facilitatem
Pontiani incidisset, fortasse an adhuc vidua ante
quam nupta sedisset (76. 1–2).
But Pontianus was captivated, and nothing Pudentilla or Apuleius
could say would keep him from marrying this girl, even though he
knew that her previous marital experience had ended with a repudium, and that she ostentatiously had herself carried about in an eightman sedan chair. She was the sort who would arrive for the wedding
with her lips artiﬁcially reddened and her cheeks covered with rouge,
and who would, even upon such an occasion, cast alluring eyes on
the young men and show too much of herself, as everyone witnessed
(76. 3-5). Such had been the lessons from her mother. Her dowry
had been borrowed the day before the wedding (76. inf.).
Why this borrowed investment? Herennius, as greedy as he was
needy, had been told by Chaldaean seers that her husband would die
after a short period, and the question of inheritance they answered
with some lie designed to please (97. 4). It follows,then, that the solution for his ﬁnancial diﬃculties was to seduce as rich a young man
as possible. Now that Pontianus had accepted the oﬀered bait, He1

Apuleius’ unrestrained narration of Herennius’ major source of income has
shocked modern critics into considering it exaggerated, or at least in bad taste. But
since Roman law oﬀered the remedies of iniuria to the husband of the insulted wife
(Gaius 3. 2.21), Apuleius must have known his statements would make him liable if
he were not telling the truth. For the matter of ‘taste’ see pp. 57–60.
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rennius “in his presumption was already devouring the whole four
million of Pudentilla” (77. 1).
The marriage accomplished, Herennius’ problem became Apuleius. He railed at his new son-in-law for aﬃancing his mother to
Apuleius, and pressured him to undo the coming match—otherwise he would take back his daughter (77. 1-3). Pontianus was convinced, but his mission to Mother was anything but a success. She,
instead of complying, complained of his being inconstant and willy-nilly. The request not to marry Apuleius turned her usually most
placid nature to “immovable wrath”. Finally, she told him she knew
perfectly well he was pleading Ruﬁnus’ case, and that she would thus
need all the more the assistance of a husband to combat “his desperate greed” (77. 5-7) .
Pudentilla’s answer precipitated the ﬁrst charge of “magic” of
which we have any record. Like the one which ﬁrst aroused Apuleius’ indignation in Claudius Maximus’ courtroom, the ﬁrst instance
was public and unoﬃcial. On hearing the bad news with which Pontianus returned, “that dealer in his own wife so swelled with wrath
and burned with rage that he called that most pure and chaste woman, in the presence of her own son, things worthy of his own bedroom, and, in the presence of several persons—whom I will name
if you like—shouted that she was a whore, and I, a magician and a
poisoner, and with his own hand he would bring about my death”
(78. init.). (This threat, incidentally, coupled with the fact that Herennius was a mime, allows Apuleius to twit him as follows: “With
whose hand? Philomela’s? Medea’s? Clytemnestra’s?” [78. 4]).
Seeing to what extent her elder son, Pontianus, had been corrupted by Herennius’ bad inﬂuence, Pudentilla wished to remove
him from it. She therefore withdrew to her country villa and wrote
her son, telling him to join her there. But at the time of writing, she
had no suspicion of the extent of her son’s lapse of ﬁlial piety: before
joining his mother, Pontianus actually turned his mother’s letter over
to Herennius, and allowed himself to be led weeping through the

14
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forum while Herennius, deceitfully omitting the parenthesized context, read from the letter:
( . . . now that our malicious detractors have won
you over, suddenly) Apuleius is a magician; he has
bewitched me and I love him too much. Come to
me then, while I am still in my right mind (82. 2 Cf.
83. 1).
This declamation ended, he would display the poor boy to the
crowd, claiming the while that the rest of the letter was worse yet:
too shameful, in fact, for public view. He therefore hid the rest of the
letter from view, but showed the deceitfully truncated sentence to
anyone who wished to look (82. 1-4). The defamation was convincing, and much of Oea conceived a violent animosity toward Apuleius. Herennius Ruﬁnus did what he could to make it grow. He continued haranging in the forum, frequently brandishing the letter and
saying: “Apuleius is a magician! She says so herself who knows and
suﬀers! What more do you want?” (82. 6).
We might wonder how Pontianus could face his mother after
this, but with all Oea believing that his mother was in the clutches
of a magician, public opinion might have obliged him to obey her
summons and come to her aid, whether he wanted to see her or not.
At any rate, come he did, and the reception was hostile. News of his
performance had preceded him, and Pudentilla warned him about
Ruﬁnus, severely scoring him for his public reading and willful misrepresentation of her letter (87. 8). He stayed at his mother’s country estate about two months, in which time Apuleius and Pudentilla
were married.
Unfortunately, Pontianus was not Pudentilla’s only problem, for
Pudens, too, was experiencing a lapse of ﬁlial piety. While still living at home, he secretly sent a letter to Pontianus which abused his
mother “nimis irreverenter, nimis contumeliose et turpiter” (84. 4).
Apuleius, realizing the source of all their problems, and apparently not cursed with a love of money himself, after some diﬃcul-
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ty persuaded Pudentilla to convey to her sons all that was properly theirs. This sum was given in real estate at the sons’ own evaluation. She was further persuaded to give them the most fruitful ﬁelds,
a grand house “richly ornate,” a great supply of wheat, barley, wine,
olive oil and other fruits, four hundred servants, and several ﬂocks.
This was to allow them to rest assured about the patrimony received
and to entertain good hopes for the rest (93. 3-5) .
Sometime earlier, when Pontianus was still in parental favor,
Apuleius had written to the proconsul, Lollianus Avitus a letter in
which he commended the young orator, Pontianus, to his attention. Apuleius’ next letter was full of the news of Pontianus’ incredible misbehavior. On discovering this, Pontianus humbly sought Apuleius’ forgiveness and a second letter of recommendation. Apuleius provided both, and the repentent Pontianus set oﬀ for Carthage,
the proconsular seat (94. 1-5). Pontianus was not the only person to
experience conversion. All Oea heard of the premature gift of the
sons’ heritage, and transferred their animosity from Apuleius to Herennius (94. 1).
The interview with the proconsul passed pleasantly: on reading Apuleius’ missive, he congratulated Pontianus for his eximia humanitate, since he had quickly corrected his error (94. 6). The proconsul wrote Apuleius an answer and charged Pontianus with delivering it to Apuleius.
Pontianus, en route home, fell ill and died. His will left his property to his mother and to Pudens. As Apuleius names her ﬁrst in
describing the testament of Pontianus, she apparently received the
greater share (97. 7). This fact may help explain why Pudens, on the
occasion of his brother’s funeral, attempted, with the assistance of a
band of brigands, to forbid his mother entry to the house she had
given him (100. 6).
It is important to note that in neither will which Pontianus
wrote did he make his wife an heir (97). Pontianus thus nulliﬁed the
eﬀect of Herennius’ machinations, and thereby obliged him to repeat them on Pudens. Further, Pontianus’ will—apparently the lat-

A POLOG Y as Prosecution

16

ter of the two—conﬁrmed all that Apuleius had said of the Herennius family:
Quippe qui ei [Herennia] ad ignominiam lintea ascribi ducentorum fere denariorum iusserit, ut intellegeretur iratus aestimasse eam quam oblitus
praeterisse (97. 6).
Isaac Casaubon interpreted this legacy as one intended to brand his
wife a harlot, citing Isidore: “Amiculum est meretricum pallium linteum; his apud veteres matronae in adulterio deprehensae induebantur”
(Orig. 19. 25) .1
Pontianus’ death and testament suﬃced to make Pudens a center of attention. The two legacy-hunters, Ruﬁnus and Aemilianus,
each having once failed to construct a channel through which to
divert Pudentilla’s resources, set a snare for Pudens and combined
their eﬀorts. Herennius aimed his widowed daughter at Pudens,
who, to further this project, was easily removed to live with his Uncle Aemilianus:
At ille puellae meretricis blandimentis et lenonis
patris illectamentis captus et possessus, exinde ut
frater eius animam edidit, relicta matre ad patruum
commigravit, quo facilius remotis nobis coepta perﬁcerentur (98. 1).
Apuleius points out that under this arrangement, should Pudens die
intestate, his estate would go “by law but not by justice” to Aemilianus (98. 2). The latter apparently wished to secure his position, for
he showed a sudden fondness for the boy, and a real willingness to
please: living at home, he was still without the toga; in his uncle’s
charge he is granted it immediately. He went to teachers and kept
good company when at home; he now goes to brothels, carouses
with the worst sort, is allowed to act as lord of house and household,
1

Casaubon’s interpretation is cited by Butler and Owen, Apulei Apologia, Oxford
1914, p. 171, commentary.
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and goes to the gladiators’ school, where the keeper himself teaches
him the names, battles, and wounds of the ﬁghters (98. 5-7).
Pudentilla, suﬀering from her son’s outrageous conduct toward her, became ill and disinherited Pudens. But Apuleius wished
to pour coals of kindness on his head, and went to the extreme of
threatening to leave her to get his way, so great was her distaste for
her son. Pudens was not only reinstated, but made ﬁrst heir (99. 4).
This was not made known to Aemilianus nor to his young ward until Apuleius announced it at the trial (99. 5).
This, in sum, was the situation at the time of the trial: Apuleius
had three enemies leagued against him, Herennius Ruﬁnus, Aemilianus, and Pudens. Their leader Herennius would allow no opportunity for defaming Apuleius to pass unused, no matter how unfair
or unjust it might be. This he demonstrated beyond any question on
the occasion of his public readings. The trial took place three years
after Apuleius’ arrival in Oea (55. 10). The campaign of defamation,
the reader will recall, had begun about two months before the wedding of Apuleius and Pudentilla, an event which took place somewhat more than a year after Apuleius’ arrival (73. 7 and 9). By the
time of the trial, then, Apuleius had been subjected to two years of
hatred and slander.
The next event in the chronology is the trial of Apuleius on a
charge of magic. Before investigating how the trial originated, it will
be appropriate, especially since Apuleius is the only source for the
trial, to evaluate the trustworthiness of the Apology.

The Credibility of Apuleius

C HAPTER II

T HE C REDIBILITY

OF

A PULEIUS

B

ut how trustworthy is Apuleius as a source? May we believe
the evidence which he presents in his Apology ? There are many
who would have him, to speak frankly, a liar. For instance, Adam Abt
concludes that if Apuleius was found innocent, he owed it not to innocence but to a “ﬂicke Zunge.”1 Vallette, attempting to show that
Apuleius used his statue of Mercury for magic, is dissatisﬁed with
his author as a useful source, and faces the matter squarely: “Sommesnous forces de croire Apulée sur parole?”2
Three factors indicate that our answer must be “Yes”: 1) The accuser is a convicted perjurer who—as Apuleius has shown to the satisfaction of ancient and modern judges—committed perjury again, and
on numerous occasions, during the course of the trial. It is distinctly
unlikely that a perjured accusation necessitated a perjured answer. 2)
Examination shows that the single instance of a “misrepresentation”
on the part of Apuleius is no misrepresentation at all—a fact which
leaves us with no precedent for assuming that Apuleius would lie. 3)
The widespread view that the Apology might have been improved between delivery and publication ignores the evidence of Florida 9. 13,
an express statement that the great orator’s speeches were customarily
stenographed at delivery, a fact which makes it probable that we have
the Apology essentially as Apuleius delivered it.
The Credibility of Apuleius’ Accuser
If there are, as Vallette suspects, lies in the Apology, it will be well to
1

Adam Abt, Apologie und Zauberei, p. 259.

2

Paul Vallette, L’Apologie d’Apulée, p. 317.
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understand who is responsible for them. Sicinius Aemilianus seems
to have made a career of being caught in untruths. Here we will not
consider all of them, but only the major falsehoods proven by evidence or those whose circumstances admit of no reasonable doubt.
Earlier Sicinius had been punished for perjury before the prefect of
Rome and a panel of consulars (2. 9f; 3. 1). The lie was the more vicious as it had been persistently and impudently maintained. Before
the trial, this same Aemilianus publicly called Apuleius the murderer of his stepson. Later, when obliged to accuse oﬃcially, he conveniently omitted this charge, admitting, in eﬀect, that it was an insupportable lie (1. 5; 2. 1). Similarly, he insisted that Apuleius kept
a magic talisman hidden away. He was obliged to admit that he had
never seen it, but nonetheless insisted that it was an instrument of
magic (54). When the accusation had been entered, he purchased
a deposition from one Junius Crassus. But Crassus eﬀectively admitted the falsehood of the deposition by not showing up at the forum to acknowledge it as his own.1 Desperate for something with
some verisimilitude about it, Sicinius announced that Apuleius had
searched through the whole town for ebony, and that he had had
a grisly skeleton made from this rare wood, and that this was all
done in secret (61) . For support, he summoned the artisan who had
carved the wood. This worthy craftsman declared that he had made
it openly, that the wood had been the gift of Pontianus, and that the
ﬁgurine in question was no skeleton, but a Mercury (61. 6–8). The
accusers also charged that Apuleius had enchanted a boy, who, as
a result of the incantation, had fallen down and suﬀered a lapse of
memory (42. 3-4). Unfortunately, the slave whom they named was
known to be an epileptic, and the charge was greeted with raised
eyebrows and angry murmurings (46. 1).
Aemilianus had further stated that Pudentilla, until forced by
Apuleius’ magic, had never given thought to remarriage. He was
caught in this lie, too. His own letter to her son Pontianus, advising
1

New evidence supporting this is oﬀered below, pp. 92–95.
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him of her marital plans, is produced in court. This allows Apuleius
to shame his adversary: “Give it to him, let him read it, that with his
own voice and his own words he may defeat himself. . . . Please, read
louder” (69. 6-7). Since he has a further point to make with it, he repeats the burden of the letter, thus preserving for us the proof of Aemilianus’ falsehood: “I know she ought to marry and wants to, but
whom she will pick I have no idea” (70. 1).
There was likewise the letter from Pudentilla to Pontianus, reading in part: “Apuleius is a magician? he has bewitched me and I am
too much in love with him. Come to me then, while I am still in my
right mind.” Apuleius’ enemies had read this all over town (above, p.
12) and used it at the trial as proof of their main charge, that Apuleius had bewitched Pudentilla into marrying him (82). Apuleius
produces this letter to Pontianus, in a copy certiﬁed by Pontianus’
librarian, by Aemilianus, and by Apuleius.1 He has it read, and another lie is exposed:
When you found that I was set on marrying again
you yourself persuaded me to choose him over all
others, so much did you marvel at the man and
wish to make him a member of the family through
me. But now that our malicious detractors have won
you over, suddenly Apuleius is a magician; he has
bewitched me and I love him too much . . . (83. 1).
To strengthen his case, Aemilianus had stated that Pudentilla was
sixty years old. Apuleius produced her sealed birth certiﬁcate, showing her not yet forty (89).
Such was the fabric of the accusation against Apuleius. It does
not seem likely that such bald ﬁction born of desperation would
have required countering lies alike born of desperation. But the idea
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frequently turns up that Apuleius misrepresented the accusation.1
The most succinct expression of this suspicion is that we know as
much of Aemilianus’ accusation from Apuleius as we know of Catiline from Cicero. At ﬁrst glance, this seems an apt and neat parallel,
but it has a serious failing that has led to error. As head of the Roman state, Cicero is presumably the man best informed about Catiline. Cicero knows all; his audience knows what Cicero chooses
to tell them. Unlike Catiline, Aemilianus is given a hearing by the
same audience which will hear his adversary. The audience is as wellinformed on the points of the accusation as Apuleius is. He is therefore not free to edit or to mutilate it. He is oﬃcially on trial for his
life, and such chicanery could only hurt him. Once the indictment
was accepted, Apuleius was obliged to answer it; the alternative was
forfeiture. Furthermore, as Apuleius himself says, to omit a point of
the accusation could be interpreted as confession rather than scorn
(3. 8). He was obliged to retrace its course, step by step. But as it
turned out, the accusation was a patent absurdity, and step by step
became one reduction to the absurd after another. We must not confuse mutilation with reduction. Circumstances forbade the one; the
nature of the accusation made the other inevitable.
A Misrepresentation?
Before discounting statements of Apuleius which displease, a critic
should be able to show precedent where Apuleius has distinctly deviated from truth. Butler and Vallette have noted a single instance.
The instance will bear examination.
This concerns the age of Pudens. The circumstances follow. During the period in question, a youth generally assumed the toga virilis
at the age of fourteen or ﬁfteen.2 In a letter written before Apuleius’

1

Aemilianus himself made the copy: “. . . quas tamen litteras tabulario Pontiani
praesente et contra scribente Aemiliano nudius tertius, tuo iussu, Maxime, descripsimus (78. 6).” Cf. also 88. 1. The tabularius mentioned in 78. 6 seems to be identical
with the promus librorum of 53. 8.

1

E.g., Abt, op. cit., passim; Vallette, op. cit., p. 317; L. Herrmann, “Le Proces
d’Apulée,” RUB n.s. 4 (1952) pp. 339–350.
2

Joachim Marquardt, Pas Privatleben der Römer, Hirzel, 1886, p. 127.
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arrival in Oea, Pudentilla described her younger son Pudens as virili
togae idoneus, and Apuleius states that the trial occurred three years
after his arrival (70. 1, 55. 12). This would make Pudens seventeen or
eighteen. But Apuleius never refers to Pudens with any word more
complimentary than puer. This leads to a common objection. H. E.
Butler, for instance, corrects Apuleius with these words:
Apuleius always lays stress on the extreme youth
of Pudens, and hints that he assumed the toga at
an unduly early age. But as a matter of fact, he can
scarcely have been less than 18 at the time of the
trial.
He takes up the complaint in his note: “Apuleius’ suggestion that
Pudens’ admission was premature (98) cannot be taken very seriously . . . .”1 Vallette makes much the same cavil:
Sicinius Pudens est toujours presente par Apulée
comme un tout jeune homme, presque comme un
enfant. Au moment du procès, il a avait depuis peu
pris la toge virile. Il avait donc au moins quatorze
ou quinze ans. Sa mere restait veuve quatorze ans.2
The misrepresentation is apparent only. Apuleius has good and
valid reasons for calling Pudens puer. The ﬁrst use of the appellation
(2. 3) is justiﬁed by the fact that Pudens is under twenty ﬁve, the age
of legal responsibility, a fact which the proconsul Claudius himself
noticed (2. 5). Even now, we are infants before the law until twenty
one.
Apuleius’ allusions to the youth of Pudens refer not to his age
but to his maturity. The second reference to Pudens, for instance, exposes “puerum ilium . . . curae meae ereptum, . . . in me ac matrem
suam nefarie eﬀeratum, . . . desertis liberalibus studiis ac repudiata omni disciplina . . .” (28. 7–8). These beginnings, says Apuleius,
1 H. E. Butler

and A. S. Owen, Apulei Apologia, Oxford, 1914, p. xx.

2Apulée: Apologie, Florides, p. xix.
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show that he will not be another Pontianus (whom Apuleius styles
“adultus” [69. 5], “splendidissimus eques” [62. 4], and “disertus iuvenis” [98. 9]), but rather another Aemilianus (28. 8–9) .
Apuleius’ next reference to Pudens (45. 7) dubs him “puerulum
ilium.” Here “that little boy” is mentioned as the only witness who
states that Apuleius “enchanted” a boy (who happened to be an epileptic) causing him to fall. It could, of course, be said that Apuleius
is attempting to discredit an opposing witness. But is must be noted
that by so witnessing, Pudens discredited himself, showing suﬃcient
immaturity to deserve the diminutive, for it was an obvious lie, and
was so recognized:
Tannonius [Aemilianus’ lawyer] . . . cum hoc quoque mendacium frigere ac prope iam omnium vultu et murmure explosum videret, ut vel suspiciones
quorundam spe moraretur, ait pueros alios producturum qui sint aeque a me incantati (46. 1).
This lie which Tannonius used to shore up that of Pudens, incidentally, was also found out. Speaking of these pueri alii incantati, Apuleius says: “Sed nil amplius dico. Ut producant!” (46. 2).
Another use of the diminutive puerulus applied to Pudens (75.
4) is similarly explained by its context, which explains how Pudens
has been corrupted by Herennius Ruﬁnus. It seems apparent that
Apuleius intends the diminutive to be a comment on the boy’s immaturity: Pontianus, otherwise mentioned with honoriﬁcs by Apuleius, is subjected to a diminutive only when Apuleius sadly recounts
his being duped by this same Ruﬁnus (77. 3).
Similarly, the next reference to “that boy” has nothing to do with
misrepresenting his age. It is rather, as its context shows, a justiﬁed
comment on his maturity:
Cur autem praeterita conqueror, cum non sint minus acerba praesentia? Hocusque a vobis miserum
istum puerum depravatum, ut matris suae epistu-
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He never speaks anything but Punic, except for
what little Greek he learned from his mother, for
he has neither will nor ability to speak Latin. You,
Maximus, a little earlier heard (Heavens!) my stepson, the brother of the articulate Pontianus, stumbling over his few syllables when you questioned
him . . . (98. 8-9).

las, quas putat amatorias, pro tribunali proconsulis
recitet apud virum sanctissimum Claudium Maximum, ante has Imperatoris Pii statuas, ﬁlius matri
suae pudenda exprobret stupra et amores obiectet?
(85. 1)
The next reference to Pudens is called by H. E. Butler a “suggestion that Pudens’ admission was premature” (noted above, p. 24). It
is not a suggestion, but a statement. It concerns not age, but withholding and granting an honor. Pudentilla, for her own valid reasons, had not yet seen ﬁt to invest Pudens with the toga virilis. Pontianus died, leaving Pudens the chief heir to the family fortune. He
was promptly and blatantly seduced by his uncle Aemilianus, who
was next in line (98. 2-4). Investiture was one of his blandishments:
“Investem a nobis accepisti? vesticem ilico reddidisti” (98. 5).1 There
is no reason why this statement should not be taken seriously. It is
not inconsistent with the age of Pudens, no matter what his age at
the time. In fact, there is nothing signiﬁcant about the investiture
except the identity of the man who granted it, and the circumstances
of greed which surrounded it.
Further evidence that Apuleius does not misrepresent Pudens’
age is to be found in the penultimate reference to “that boy.” His age
is admitted by the context, but his immaturity is still insisted upon
by the word puer: “cum adulescentulis postremissumis inter scorta et
pocula puer hoc aevi convivium agitat” (98. 6). These activities are
entirely consistent with a boy of the seventeen or eighteen years the
critics would give Pudens.
Further, would Apuleius, no fool, misrepresent the age of a boy
or man whom the judge has right before him? The judge himself is
called to witness on the matter:
1Apparently

both the mother, while her son Pudens was still living at home, and
the uncle, Aemilianus, while his nephew Pudens was living with him, would have
been capable of bestowing the toga, as could any guardian. Cf. Marquard, Privatleben, p. 125. It was Pudentilla, however, who paid the largess which the investiture
involved (87. 10).
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Making a vir togatus of such a boy would have been an act of dishonesty. But ﬁnally, it must be noted that Apuleius made no attempt to conceal the physical maturity of Pudens. The boy’s age
in years is deﬁnitely granted at 85. 5, where he is called “ﬁlius iam
adultus.”
In sum, Apuleius does not misrepresent the age of Pudens. The
single matter which seemed a misrepresentation on the part of Apuleius fails, leaving us with no reason for taking the orator’s word
lightly.
The Pertinence of Stenography
The Apology is a long speech—from my own experiments, I ﬁnd that
it must have taken almost four hours to deliver.1 Is it possible that
such a speech could have been stenographed? There is evidence to
show that this is not only possible, but extremely likely. Practical
use of shorthand for the recording of spoken Latin is known from
63 B.C. to the ninth century.2 The technique is known from extant shorthand copies, and was once revived for experimental purposes. The modern experimenters, properly equipped with wax tablet and stylus, became proﬁcient enough to indicate that the technique, when mastered, would have enabled the ancient notarius not
1

The length of the Apology cannot be used to argue that it is an extended version
of the spoken oration. The defendant was allowed one third more time than the accuser had used (Butler and Owen, op. cit., p. 72), and Pliny boasts of speaking almost ﬁve hours, despite his poor health, when accusing Marius Crispus (Ep.2.11) .
2
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only to follow the speaker, but to continue for hours.1 This is consistent with ancient notices of stenography. Eunapius, for instance,
speaks of τούς ταχέως γράφοντας . . . οι‛ καθ´η‛μέραν μὲν τήν τη̃ς
Θέμιδος γλω̃τταν α’ ποσημαίνονται.2 This also indicates that shorthand recording was especially used for juridical speeches.
The word used to express “record by shorthand” is excipio. Cicero
seems the ﬁrst to use the verb in this sense,3 and, perhaps because it
is a neologism, is careful to make his meaning clear:
Tum ilium [Tages] plura locutum multis audientibus qui omnia verba eius exceperint, literisque
mandaverint.
Cicero also provides us with the ﬁrst speech known to have been stenographed at delivery and published by the stenographer, This is the
Pro Milone. Asconius Pedianus reports that there were two speeches:
the one Cicero delivered and the one Cicero published (11). How
did he know? The former was “excepta,” published, and, in Asconius’
time, was still extant. Asconius chooses to study the better version
not because he feels that the oratio excepta was unfaithfully recorded
(indeed, he mentions no such possibility), but because he feels the
longer version is more worth study. He seems to accept the oratio excepta as what Cicero actually said at the trial:
When Cicero began to speak, he was stopped by
the outcries of the Clodians, who, despite the armed
guards, could not restrain themselves. He therefore spoke without his usual aplomb. That recorded
speech also is extant, but he wrote the one we read
so perfectly that it may rightly be considered ﬁrst
(11).
1

Louis and Eugene Guénin, Histoire de la Sténographie, Paris, 1908, pp.
233–234.
2
3
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From this famous beginning, stenography seems to have enjoyed
wide use in the “catching” of spoken orations, and the stenography
seems to have had some eﬀect. As J. N. Settle notes “. . . this dual
existence of a published oration is without parallel.”1 Thus the ﬁrst
speech known to have been excepta is also the last speech known to
have been improved in a subsequent version by the orator. Perhaps
Cicero’s successors wished to avoid mockery. Milo, angered by the
disparity between the two versions, deliberately attempted to make
a laughing-stock of Cicero after Cicero had sent the banished Milo
a copy of the improved version. On reading it Milo opined he was
lucky that Cicero had given no such speech, for he would not then
be enjoying the ﬁne mullets of Marseilles. “This he wrote, not because he was pleased with his condition—indeed, he made many efforts to secure his return—but as a joke on Cicero, because the orator, after saying nothing useful at the time . . . had later composed
and sent to him these fruitless words, as if they could then be of
any service to him.”2 Quintilian may reﬂect how Cicero’s experience
with stenography aﬀected later orators. Even though Quintilian was
displeased that his orations had been published by stenographers, he
did not re-do them (see below, p. 28).
Various of Caesar’s speeches in the courts might have been published by stenographers. Augustus wondered if the state of Caesar’s
Pro Q. Metello was the result of publication by a bad stenographer:
“Pro Q. Metello non immerito Augustus existimat magis ab actuariis exceptam male subsequentibus verba dicentis, quam ab ipso editam” (Suet. Iul 55. 3). Even this is an indication that the craft was
capable of recording a forensic speech with ﬁdelity: if all stenographers’ publications were unfaithful versions, the words “male subsequentibus” would have been superﬂuous.
In the Augustan age, the poet Manilius was able to describe the
stenographer in these terms:

Vit. Soph. “Prohaeresius” 4.13.

1 “The Trial

TLL s.v. “excipio,” col. 1253.

2

of Milo and the Other Pro Milone,” TAPhA 94 (1963), p. 275.

Cass. Dio 40.54, tr. Ernest Cary.
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Hinc et erit scriptor velox cui litera verbum est,
quique notis linguam superet cursimque loquentis excipiat longas nova per compendia voces (4.
197–199).
Throughout the Early Empire, stenography was praised by some and
taken for granted by others. Seneca, for instance, lists exceptio among
the marvels which Reason (Scire) has wrought: “Quid verborum notas, quibus quamvis citata excipitur oratio et celeritatem linguae manus sequatur?” (Epist. 90. 25). Even more signiﬁcant than this praise
is the fact that two ﬁrst century critics, Asconius and Quintilian,
had so much faith in the ability of shorthand that they.accepted “the
other Pro Milone” as a record of what Cicero actually said. Quintilian speaks of “oratione pulcherrima, quam pro Milone scriptam reliquit” (Inst. 4.2.25). But later he has occasion to speak of a distinctly
diﬀerent Pro Milone:
Unde Ciceroni quoque in prooemio, cum diceret pro
Milone, digredi fuit necesse, ut ipsa oratiuncula qua
usus est patet (Inst. 4.3.17).
If Quintilian believes he possesses the ipsa oratiuncula qua usus est,
it could only be because he believes that some stenographer faithfully recorded the words of Cicero as he spoke in Milo’s behalf. This
at least indicates that stenography in Quintilian’s day was both commonplace and capable. He elsewhere complains that all but one of
his court speeches have been published by exceptores;
Cuius actionem [that for Naevius of Arpinum] et
quidem solam in hoc tempus emiseram, quod ipsum
me fecisse ductum iuvenale cupiditate gloriae fateor.
Nam ceterae, quae sub nomine meo feruntur, negligentia excipientium in quaestum notariorum corruptae minimam partem mei habent (Inst. 7.2.24).
It is conceivable that stenography became a usual part of the
rhetorical education. Oratory was learned by memorizing and study-
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ing orations, and there would have been no faster or cheaper way to
obtain models of current excellence. Thus the Emperor Titus, who
was educated with Nero in the imperial court (Suet. Titus 1) was
a skilled exceptor: “E pluribus comperi notis quoque excipere velocissime solitum.” Suetonius provides this information not because it
was unusual for a noble to be an exceptor, but apparently simply because it introduces an anecdote he wishes to tell: “et cum amanuensibus suis per ludum iocumque certantem” (Titus 3).
Thus the ancient notices of stenography which antedate the
Apology of Apuleius indicate that speeches could be faithfully recorded, and that court speeches were especially liable to recording and publication by stenographers. This external evidence alone
would oblige us to admit the possibility that Apuleius’ Apology was
transcribed at delivery. The evidence which the orator himself provides turns possibility to probability.
Throughout all we know of his life, Apuleius was famous enough
as an orator to attract exceptores, whether their motive was proﬁt or
self-improvement. At some unknown date he remarks that he is
obliged to give a speech in just about every town he visits.1 This was
already true three years before the trial:
Nec hoc ad tempus compono, sed abhinc ferme triennium est, cum primis diebus Oeam veneram publice disserens de Aesculapii maiestate eadem ista prae
me tuli et quot sacra nossem percensui. Ea disputatio
celebratissima est, vulgo legitur, in omnibus manibus
versatur (55. 10–11).
The speech he refers to was so read and studied that Apuleius can
expect several in the audience to be able to recite the part in ques1 Fl. 1. The town in question here is called “sanctissimam istam civitatem.”
Though this has been taken to mean Rome, the town is compared to “aliqui lucus
aut aliqui locus sanctus in via.” His punning remark “. . . quamquam oppido festinem, . . . et habenda oratio et inhibenda properatio est.” is another indication that
some village is meant, rather than such a city as Rome.
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tion: “Dicite aliquis, si qui forte meminit, huius loci principium.
Audisne, Maxime, multos suggerentis?”
Apuleius describes his experience with stenography in the ninth
section of his Florida. This fragment answers one of Apuleius’ critics,
one of the kind “who prefer to despise their betters rather than to
imitate them” (Fl. 9. 2). The critic is asked to look around at the huge
and splendid assemblage and to consider how diﬃcult it is to satisfy everyone in such a crowd, “especially for me” (Fl. 9.6). He continues with that famous remark which begins: “Quis enim vestrum
mihi unum soloecismum ignoverit?” (Fl. 9. 7) The problem which
Apuleius faces is indeed challenging: “Meum vero unumquodque dictum acriter examinatis sedulo pensiculatis, ad limam et lineam certam redigitis” (Fl. 9. 8). He explains the root of the problem: “Nam
quodcumque ad vos protuli, exceptum ilico et lectum est, nec revocare illud nec autem mutare nec emendare mihi inde quicquam licet
. . .” (Fl. 9. 13). Apuleius’ reaction to the fact of exceptio diﬀers somewhat from that of Quintilian. Quintilian used exceptio as an excuse
for the inferior quality of his published speeches. Apuleius accepted
the ﬁdelity of the exceptores. His solution is not better stenographers,
but better speeches: “. . . quo maior religio dicendi habenda est” (Fl.
9. 13) . .
The context of the statement with “exceptum ilico” (9. 13) clearly
indicates that his meaning is “Everything I have spoken has been stenographed.” The verbs describing his own part are all verbs of speaking: “syllabam pronuntiatam” (Fl. 9. 7), “verba temere blaterare” (Fl.
9. 7), “unumquodque dictum examinatis” (Fl. 9. 8), and ﬁnally, “maior
religio dicendi” (Fl. 9. 14). Yet the verb which he used in the statement in question, proferre, generally means “to publish” when used
of an oration. This is important, for it indicates that Apuleius, because of his relentless exceptores, has come to think of delivery itself
as publication.
The ninth fragment of the Florida then, is a strong indication
that every speech which we possess of the great orator was published
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(in the usual sense of the word) not by Apuleius but by enterprising
stenographers. Therefore, we probably have in the Apology not some
augmented or “improved” pamphlet, but the ipsa oratio which Apuleius actually delivered at the trial.1
In this chapter, then, we have found little reason to credit Apuleius’ accusers, no precedent for distrusting Apuleius, and good reason to believe we read essentially what Apuleius said at his trial.

1

The general view is opposed to this. E.g., Abt (op. cit., pp. 6–8) is so conﬁdent that the Apology was improved and augmented that he attempts to determine
which sections were added for publication. Vallette (Apulée, p. xxiv) says Apuleius must have reworked it. George Misch (History of Autobiography in Antiquity, p.
509) writes: “Against this charge he had brilliantly defended himself . . . and he then
published a long and lively version of his speech.”
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ment and approval, notably by Paul LeJay1 and Georg Lehnert, who
remarked:

C HAPTER III

T HE O RIGIN

OF THE

ow did the trial of Apuleius originate? The question is of capital importance to any interpretation of the Apology. The answer seems obvious and natural: the accuser almost invariably has
the initiative, and accuses a man whom he believes guilty, and against
whom he has prepared a case. This is the current view of the origin
of the trial of Apuleius.
Yet it is probable that Aemilianus and his allies, made unwary
by their unrestrained hatred for Apuleius, had no intention of legal action, but were instead trapped by the accused into making the
accusation.
This suggestion is not so unlikely as it may seem. In his dissertation, Paul Vallette proposed that Aemilianus’ purpose at the assize
of the proconsul Claudius Maximus was not to accuse, but to mobilize public opinion against Apuleius. He would have the trial begin
in this fashion:
Mais Apulée n’étend pas rester sous le coup de ces
calomnies, d’autant plus perﬁdes qu’elles n’engagent
pas la responsabilité de leurs auteurs; il veut un débat contradictoire qui lui donne le moyen d’établir
son innocence une fois pour toutes, et, prenant les
devants, il met les faiseurs de tapage en demeure de
transformer leurs médisances en une accusation en
règle.1
Vallette’s work was well received. The idea quoted above, that Apuleius had reason to start the trial, was singled out for acknowledgeL’Apologie, op. cit., pp. 20–21.
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dass Apuleius geradezu eine Interesse daran gehabt habe, in einem Prozess wegen Magie verwickelt zu werden, ist doch eine recht bedenkliche
Behauptung.2
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But Vallette did not attempt to explain how Apuleius managed to
have “the noise-makers” (“faiseurs de tapage”) transform their slander
into a regular accusation, and instead of developing his suggestion,
chose to show that Apuleius was really in some way a magician.
Vallette’s suggestion has since been completely ignored: H. E.
Butler and A. S. Owen apparently assume that the accusers had the
accusation prepared in advance.3 Adam Abt, whose book is an attempt to show that all points of the accusation were valid, seems to
base his work on the assumption that the accusation was planned in
advance and even bona ﬁde. Similarly, the chronology of Roger Pack
has “an interval of astonishing length [a year and a half ] between
Pontianus’ death and the trial which it occasioned . . . . So the accusers had ample time to marshall every possible bit of evidence before
they seized the pretext, furnished by the Granii, for launching their
attack”4 (emphasis added). More recently, C. P. Golann has taken
the accusation against Apuleius seriously enough to call it “smoke”
for which we should attempt to ﬁnd the “ﬁre,” i.e., actual guilt of
magical practices.5
But for one attempting to show that the trial of Apuleius occurred only because Apuleius wanted it to, there is more support
than a passing sentence in Vallette’s dissertation. Apuleius was a
1

Revue Critique d’Histoire et de Litterature, vol. 2 (1909), p. 316.

2

Jahrsbericht Bd. 175, p. 15.

3

Apulei Apologia, pp. xv and commentary, 2.

4

“The Adventures of a Dilettante,” p. 79.

5

The Life of Apuleius, p. 141.
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splendid advocate, and it is almost exclusively to him that I appeal.
He said, for instance: “Ultro eos ad accusandum crebris ﬂagitationibus provocavi” (1. 6). There is much valuable evidence in the Apology of Apuleius which has been ignored or else not fully evaluated.
It will therefore be fruitful to examine and analyze much of the text
rather closely.
The examination will tend to show the following: The accusers
had grudges against Apuleius, rather than evidence. The trial took
place because Apuleius wished it; his motive for so wishing was vindication of his name and vengeance on his enemies. These had been
foolish enough to give him the opportunity for vengeance—an opportunity which the proconsul helped him use. Never in danger, Apuleius was free to spend as much time exposing and destroying his
enemies as he spent establishing his own innocence.
As was noted above, (p. 17), Apuleius has, by the time of the
trial, been subjected to about two years of hatred and slander by his
greedy in-laws, Herennius and Aemilianus. These legacy-hunters
had been hoping to acquire a large portion of Pudentilla’s estate, and
saw in Apuleius the failure of all their hopes. They therefore hated
him so much that they threatened to kill him (see above, p. 13).
Another display of this hatred and slander vented against Apuleius occurred at the assize of Claudius Maximus, proconsul of
the province of Africa. Apuleius was pleading a case in behalf of
his wife Pudentilla—who does not seem to have made the trip
from Oea—“when Aemilianus’ lawyers, according to plan, began
to advance upon me, unsuspecting, with curses, and to accuse me
of wrong-doings by magic, and even of the murder of my stepson
Pontianus.” 1
Was this a formal request for a trial? It has been said that the
death of Pontianus “occasioned” the trial of Apuleius (cf. p. 33
1 “cum me causam pro uxore Pudentilla adversus Granios agere aggressum de
composito necopinantem patroni eius incessere maledictis et insimulare magicorum
ac denique necis Pontiani privigni mei coepere.” (1. 5)
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above). Let us see whether such a thing can be true. The maledicta
and insimulationes occurred just as Apuleius was pleading his wife’s
case against the Granii (1. 5). It seems incredible that a genuine request for a trial should have been cried out at the time when the intended defendant happened to be speaking for his client. It seems
far more likely that what we have here is simply an interruption, as
Cicero was interrupted by the outcries of the Clodians. The purpose of the interruption would be the same in each case, rather like
a golfer coughing deeply just as his opponent begins his putt. Like
their Clodian predecessors, the hecklers of Apuleius had no plans to
prove what they shouted, or to make the speaker whom they interrupted a defendant.
Like Cicero delivering the original Pro Milone, Apuleius, delivering his Pro Pudentilla, was completely stopped, and turned his full
attention to the hecklers who had broken in upon his speech:
Quae ego cum intellegerem non tam crimina iudicio quam obiectamenta iurgio prolata, ultro eos ad
accusandum crebris ﬂagitationibus provocavi (1. 6).
This sentence conﬁrms two points: His enemies had no intention to
accuse Apuleius of anything; Apuleius’ trial originated, not because
anyone suspected Apuleius was guilty, but because Apuleius desired
vengeance and vindication.
When the accusation became oﬃcial, the accusers had decided
to drop their charge of murder (2. 1). In the interim Herennius and
Ruﬁnus, with their lawyer Tannonius Pudens, had therefore determined that they had no chance to prove their charge of the murder of Pontianus. Their initial maledicta and insimulationes could
then represent a bona ﬁde, prepared-in-advance case only if Pontianus’ death had been very recent. Had it antedated the trial of Apuleius by any reasonable length of time, they would have had enough
time to make this decision earlier and thus avoid the embarrassment
of having to retreat from such a strong statement in the presence of
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the proconsul and his retinue. This is all the more evident since this
decision was made in a single day (2. 3) .
There is evidence which allows us to determine the interval between Pontianus’ death and the trial. The proconsular term of Lollianus Avitus had all but expired when Pontianus went to visit him—
he was already expecting his successor Claudius Maximus.1 The
proconsular term ended June 30. Since the outgoing proconsul entrusted Pontianus with returning his reply to Apuleius, his return
journey, and his death, occurred within that June or July. His death
may be an indication of how unhealthy it was to cross north Africa
in midsummer. If one had a choice, he apparently made the trip in
the middle of winter. Apuleius, for instance, chose the winter for his
trip to Alexandria (“hiemps anni erat,” [72. 2]). Pontianus himself
had told Apuleius that he would have to wait for the next winter for
his trip to Alexandria, since his illness had lasted through the winter in which he had started (72. 5). It would seem then, that the trial, which involved a 350-mile trip from the proconsular seat on the
part of Claudius Maximus, occurred some time after the start of the
traveling season, i.e., in mid-winter. Thus the accusers had about six
months in which to prepare their case against Apuleius for murder,
time which, if it had been used for preparation, would have suﬃced
to show them that they had no case.
The fact that the accusers dropped their charge of murder, coupled with the fact that they had had time enough in which to develop it had their intentions been serious, tends to show that Aemilianus and his friends had no plans to accuse Apuleius of anything.
Certainly they had not been busily preparing the murder charge for
a year and a half. This theory seems precluded by diﬃculties of probability and chronology. If they had been preparing a year and a half
to charge murder, one further day of preparation would not have
made them think it impractical, and, as the proconsulship had an
1 “Itaque acceptis litteris Carthaginem pergit, ubi iam prope exacto consulatus
sui munere Lollianus Avitus, te, Maxime, opperiebatur” (94. 5).
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annual term, from the end of one term to a point in time within the
course of the next has to be less than a year.
This reconstruction supports Apuleius’ very ﬁrst comment on
the accusation ﬁled against him: “. . . accusationem mei prius apud te
coeptam quam apud se cogitatam . . .” (1. 1). Its authors had not intended to start anything serious. They apparently looked upon Apuleius’ court speech in behalf of his wife—presumably delivered before a large crowd in the forum of Sabratha—as but another chance
to defame Apuleius in public and embarrass him. Apuleius, as we
have seen, seemed disappointed that their intentions were not serious, and challenged them to accuse with repeated ﬂagitationes. 1 The
Latin word has a signiﬁcance which English equivalents lack. Flagitatio was the aggrieved party’s public demand upon the wrongdoer, “with a view to compelling him to make good or compensate for
some disgraceful act.” 2
The wrong which Apuleius’ ﬂagitationes insist be made good
would seem to have come under the heading iniuria. Gaius, whose
contemporaneity with Apuleius makes him the best source for the
state of Roman law at the time of the trial, says:
Iniuria autem committitur non solum cum quis
pugno . . . aut fuste percussus vel etiam verberatus
erit, sed etiam si cui convicium factum fuerit . . . (3.
220).
Iniuria, he explains, consists of two degrees, simple iniuria, and the
more serious iniuria atrox (Gai. 3. 225). An act of iniuria can be
classed as atrox if committed in a public place, “such as a theater or
a forum” (Gai. 3. 225). We may presume that the assize of Claudius Maximus was held in the forum of Sabratha, or at least in some
similarly open and public place. The “faiseurs de tapage,” then, from
their maledicta and insimulationes and the public place in which they
1

1.6. The passage is quoted on p. 35 above.

2

J. M. Kelly, Roman Litigation, Oxford, 1966, p. 22.
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uttered them, committed iniuria atrox and were liable. This would
seem to be the legal fulcrum which Apuleius used to raise the latest attack in their campaign of defamation from the level of slander to the level of an oﬃcial accusation. It seems apparent that the
only way for them to evade liability for their remarks would be to
prove them true. At any rate, this is the course which Apuleius invites them to take, and his ﬂagitatio succeeds. “Ibi vero, Aemilianus,
cum te quoque acrius motum et ex verbis rem factam videret . . . ” (1.
7). Does Apuleius mean that Claudius Maximus frowned at Aemilianus? At least that, and probably much more, for Claudius’ reaction
to Aemilianus’ loud interruption, even though represented only by
the two words “acrius motum,” was the means through which Apuleius’ will is accomplished: “ex verbis rem factam.”
Indeed, one may suppose that Claudius Maximus, in sustaining
the complaint of Apuleius, might even have told the oﬀenders what
he thought their iniuria atrox deserved; the penalty for this degree
of iniuria depended solely on the discretion of the judge (Gai. 3.
225). What could Aemilianus do? There was only one path for him
to take, and Claudius pointed him ﬁrmly in that direction: “[Aemilianus] ad subscribendum compellitur” (2. 1).
But avoiding liability for iniuria atrox was to jump from the frying pan into the ﬁre: if the charges were groundless, to make an ofﬁcial accusation of them was to commit calumnia, a criminal oﬀense.
1 But their accomplice Pudens, though grown up, was still below the
age of legal responsibility, and putting the accusation in his name
would leave all three out of the law’s reach. This they did (2. 3). It
would seem, then, that the trial arose, not because Aemilianus and
his friends had a case against Apuleius, but because Apuleius had
a case against them: their hatred of Apuleius led them to commit a
wrong. They could avoid liability for this wrong only by committing
a greater one for which Pudens’ age would permit them to escape
1

See the following chapter, esp. p. 41.
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punishment. This hypothesis squares well with another statement of
Apuleius on the origin of the trial:
Neque ulla alia causa praeter cassam invidian reperiri potest, quae iudicium istud mihi et multa antea pericula vitae conﬂaverit (66. 3).
Not evidence, but an obsessive hatred which trapped the obsessed
precipitated the “trial of Apuleius.”
Though we refer to it as the trial of Apuleius, since he is the
one oﬃcially accused, Aemilianus and his accomplices are rather
the ones on trial: theirs is the only crime which has been committed. The relationship between the two parties may be compared with
that between “plaintiﬀ ” and “defendant” in the following discussion
of the two roles:
It follows from any deﬁnition of a lawsuit, whether referable to ancient or modern times, that only
one of the parties is anxious to press ahead with the
matter, while the other would be pleased if it went
no further. Only the plaintiﬀ is dissatisﬁed with the
present state of aﬀairs and wishes to improve his position at the expense of his opponent; the defendant
would be well content to be left alone. When they
appear in court together, it is because the plaintiﬀ
wants to, and the defendant has to. 1
Like the plaintiﬀ, Apuleius is the one anxious to press ahead. Aemilianus “quaerere occepit ex diﬃdentia latibulum aliquod temeritati”
(1. 7). We have seen that Apuleius had good reason to be “dissatisﬁed with the present state of aﬀairs,” and now, after two years of harassment, threats, and defamation, “wishes to improve his position
at the expense of his opponent.” Speciﬁcally, Apuleius considers the
1

J. M. Kelly, op. cit., p. 4.
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trial an opportunity, and twice says so. In the ﬁrst instance, the trial
is a “copia et facultas purgandae apud imperitos philosophiae et probandi mei” (1. 3)1 and, as he rephrases it in the second instance, an
occasio “ut invidiam meam . . . palam restinguerem” (67. 5). There remains only the plaintiﬀ ’s volition to appear and the defendant’s obligation: Apuleius’ comment on the event of the trial is “gratulor medius ﬁdius” (1. 3); his opponent Aemilianus “compellitur.” (2. 1). In
this sense, then, Apuleius was the prosecutor. An examination of the
whole of the Apology shows it to be consistent with this view: If we
consider it as a trial of Apuleius, the trial was something of a farce; if
we consider it a trial of Aemilianus, it was devastating.
In lieu of a trial on the charge of calumnia, which Aemilianus
has avoided, and in lieu of the established penalties for calumnia,
which Aemilianus by that same act forestalled, Apuleius turns his
“apologia” into a prosecution, and simultaneously provides a worse
penalty: exposure.

C HAPTER IV

C ALUMNIA: C RIME AND P ROSECUTION

The Crime

N

o one seems to have pointed out that the accusation against
Apuleius was a criminal act.1 The crime was calumnia. I do
not contend that Apuleius oﬃcially or technically accuses Pudens
and his two helpers of calumnia, only that Apuleius, with justice, repeatedly points out that their accusation entailed calumnia, and that
calumnia happened to be a serious oﬀense. Paulus states: “Calumniosus est, qui sciens prudensque per fraudem aliqui negotium comparat.” (1.5.1) This concise deﬁnition of the crime seems to have
been rather constant. It is signiﬁcant that Apuleius accuses2 Aemilianus in essentially these same terms: “At tu, miser, prudens et sciens
delinquis.” (52. 4) A reference to the third key condition of calumnia,
fraus, comes in Apuleius’ next sentence: “. . . falsum pro vero insimulas.” Gaius oﬀers two deﬁnitions which may clarify the nature of the
oﬀense. To commit calumnia is “per fraudem et frustrationem alios
vexare litibus.” (Dig. 50.16.233) The second oﬀers more detail. The
calumniator
. . . intellegit non recte se agere, sed vexandi adversa1

1

Although this passage, if considered alone, might seem like nothing more than
good rhetoric, two factors indicate that his self-congratulation on the opportunity
of the trial is sincerely meant. He has been viciously maligned with slanders which
he has not before had a public chance to refute. Secondly, he has documentary proof
(noted below, pp. 86–96) that the accusation leveled against him is false.

It is well enough known that the motive for placing the accusation “nomine
Sicini Pudentis admodum pueri” (2. 3) would have been to avoid indictment for
false accusation. This was observed by Hildebrand, Butler and Owen, in their commentaries, ad loc., and by Vallette (L’Apologie, p. 31, n.6.). Hildebrand, citing Cod.
Theod. 9.39. 8, further noted that Gratianus (Emperor of the West, 367–383) determined that those who accuse in someone else’s name could not thus evade liability for the accusation.
2 Here, and wherever Apuleius is said to be accusing Aemilianus, Herennius, or
Pudens, a veritable accusation is meant, not a technical accusation.

41

42

A POLOG Y as Prosecution

C ALUMNIA : Crime and Prosecution

rii gratia actionem instituit potiusque ex iudicis errore vel iniquitate victoriam sperat, quam ex causa
veritatis: calumnia in eﬀectu est (4.173).

hood. Apuleius knows it for a certainty (“Certus equidem eram . . . ”
he begins, [1. 1]), for the simple and valid reason that he is innocent.
Further, he has been the object of their malicious slander, as we have
seen, for two years now, and knows it for what it is. He is therefore
able to begin with assurance: his comment on the opportunity (“copia et facultas” [1. 2]) of the trial, “I am rather conﬁdently glad,” may
be taken quite literally. Though he was not expecting them to repeat their familiar slander before a proconsul, and so was taken by
surprise (1. 4 and 5) he calls their initial charges calumniae (1. 4).
He likewise calls their oﬃcial accusation (when they ﬁnally made it)
“calumnia magiae,” which, he states, “is more easily used for defamation than proven” (1. 4). As we have seen, events had already proved
the ﬁrst half of this statement—they had quite succeeded in defaming Apuleius. The outcome of the trial was to prove the truth of the
second half.

The penalty for the crime varied. Infamia was prescribed, and included loss of various civil rights: The infamis could not hold a magistracy, serve in the army, vote, nor appear as accuser or advocate in
a criminal court.1 But the calumniator also risked arbitrary punishment ‘extra ordinem. This is a later development; our ﬁrst source for
it is Gaius, who, as has been noted, was a contemporary of Apuleius.
He notes that the malicious prosecutor “extra ordinem damnatur, id
est exilium aut relegationem aut ordinis amotionem patiatur” (Dig.
47.10.43). The trend seems to have been to match the penalty to that
which the calumniator attempted to have inﬂicted upon his victim,
and to ﬁt it to the oﬀender’s rank. One hundred years later, Paulus
stated: “in privatis et in publicis iudiciis omnes calumniosi extra ordinem pro qualitate admissi plectuntur.”2 As was noted above (p. 7),
we have an instance of a calumniator of a capital crime suﬀering the
worst form of capital punishment, cruciﬁxion, within thirty years of
the time of the Apology. It would seem, then, that Aemilianus would
have been in grave danger without a minor to hide behind.
Apuleius from time to time reminds Aemilianus that he is in a
serious position. Knowing the penalties for calumnia as well as he
knows the legal deﬁnition, Apuleius hints that the present case of
calumnia deserves capital punishment, and at one point states outright that it deserves exile.3
Apuleius is fully aware of the crime, fully aware of how neatly the deﬁnition ﬁts the present instance, and takes full and understandable pleasure in pressing his case against the criminals. Thus
his ﬁrst sentence is a statement that the accusation is a rash false1 J. L. Strachan-Davidson, Problems of the’ Roman Criminal Law (Oxford, 1912),
vol. 2, p. 137.
2

Sent. 1.5.2 and Dig. 48.16.3, cited by Strachan-Davidson, vol. 2, p. 138.

3

See below, pp. 91–93.
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The Crime Recognized
Apuleius was not alone in recognizing the crime for what it was.
Everyone present must have realized that the case was a clear matter
of calumnia. Even though Aemilianus was the individual whom the
judge compelled to accuse oﬃcially, the accusation was placed in the
name of the infant Pudens. That the only motive for this would have
been to avoid responsibility 1 for the calumnia which the accusation
entailed was observed at the assize:
. . . novo more per alium lacessendi, scilicet ut obtentu aius aetatulae ipse insimulationis falsae non
1

Apuleius correctly states that the accusers avoid responsibility by placing the
accusation in Pudens’ name. Even though he had been given the toga virilis, Pudens
was not yet old enough to be accountable for an accusation, for a Roman youth did
not become a fully responsible citizen until 25 years old. This was a ruling of the
Lex Plaetoria, which was in eﬀect from ca. 183 b.c. onwards. The Digest speciﬁcally names calumnia as a charge to which minors under 25 are not liable (48.6.15.6;
4.4.37.1). See Mommsen, Strafrecht, p. 494 and Girard, Manuel de Droit Romain,
pp. 229–235.
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plecteretur. Quod cum tu sollertissime animadvertisses et iccirco eum denuo iussisses proprio nomine
accusationem delatam sustinere . . . (2. 4-5).

before the same or another praetor: the denegatio did not have the
absolving eﬀect of a judgment with ‘juristic force’ for the defendant.”1 Further, and more important, a denegatio would have deprived Apuleius of his facultas probandi mei. Knowing this, and recognizing calumnia when he saw it, Claudius Maximus accepted the
case and hastened it to allow no time for it to gain strength through
sham. Indeed, so great was his interest in speeding the case that he
accepted an accusation submitted in a form which he had at least
twice forbidden.
Thus the accusation was admitted not because anybody thought
there was anything to it, but because the judge, like Apuleius, wished
to stop, once for all, the defamation campaign against Apuleius. The
trial which resulted from such circumstances may aptly be termed a
farce. Apuleius seems to intend that his trial be considered a farce, and
he gives reason to believe that it actually was. He makes dozens of
jokes, some at the expense of the very idea of magic, most possible
only because the accusation was a calumnia, and all directed against
the accusers. Though it could be said that Apuleius is only following
the advice of his model Aristotle, to answer the opponent’s severity
with laughter and his laughter with severity (Ars Rhet 3.18), yet it is
more likely that Apuleius actually has something to laugh at. Laughter is one of his best weapons in his attack upon the delinquent accusers. The laughter is in all cases the laughter of disdain and scorn.2

Though repeatedly ordered by Claudius Maximus to place the accusation in his own name, Aemilianus persisted in his evasion of responsibility. By so doing, he admitted that the accusation was calumniosa: normally, only the person guilty of a crime feels a need to
evade the crime’s penalties. Apuleius makes much this same point:
Igitur et priusquam causa ageretur, facile intellectu cuivis fuit qualisnam accusatio futura esset, quius
qui fuerat professor et machinator idem ﬁeri auctor
timeret (2. 8).
Everyone who had witnessed Aemilianus’ incredible performance
must have realized that the answer to the question “qualis accusatio”
was “calumniosa.”
The notable brevity of the trial (four or ﬁve days from origin to
the concluding speech of the defense, [1. 5]) was a direct result of
the fact that the true nature of the accusation was recognized. Apuleius, summing up about the letter from Pudentilla to Pontianus,
remarks:
Bene, quod integras epistulas matris Pontianus ex
more adservavit; bene, quod vos festinatio iudicii
antevortit, ne quid in istis litteris ex otio novaretis.
Tuum hoc, Maxime, tuaeque providentiae beneﬁcium est, quod a principio intellectas calumnias, ne
corroborarentur tempore, praecipitasti et nulla impertita mora subnerviasti (84. 5–6).
But “eius est actionem denegare, qui posset et dare.”1 If Claudius
knew the charge was a calumnia, why didn’t he just throw it out?
First, if a judge denied a case, “the plaintiﬀ could try his luck again
1

Ulpian Dig. 50.17.102.1, cited by Leopold Wenger, Otis Fisk tr., Institutes of
the Roman Law of Civil Procedure, New York, 1940, p. 104.
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The Crime Prosecuted
Apuleius’ interest in prosecuting his accusers as well as rebutting
their accusation is shown by a number of factors. Most obvious, of
course, are his frequent and direct accusations of calumnia (a noun
which he uses only in the Apology, where he uses it 23 times).3 Oth1 Ibid. Cf. also
2
3

F. Schultz Classical Roman Law, Oxford, 1961, pp. 13, 17.

His jokes will be pointed out as they are met in the discussion of the text.

Cf. B. E. Perry et al. Index Apuleianus, Middletown, Conn. 1934, p. 52 s.v.
calumnia.

A POLOG Y as Prosecution

C ALUMNIA : Crime and Prosecution

er indicators are his manner in dealing with each point of the accusation, the class of evidence which he chooses to use, and his repeated suggestions that such an accusation deserves punishment, in spite
of Aemilianus’ evasion of liability.
For example, Apuleius’ very narration of their evasion, witnessed
by all, and damning to his enemies, shows an interest in reminding everyone that his accusers are committing calumnia. He himself,
of course, is innocent of magic. He spends much of the time allotted him in thus attacking Aemilianus as a calumniator. The ﬁrst intimation that Aemilianus should be punished for calumnia despite his
evasion occurs in chapter two. After recalling that Aemilianus had refused to sustain the accusation in his own name even though the proconsul had repeatedly ordered him to do so, Apuleius continues: “But
even now he rebels against you, at second hand, through calumniae (2.
6).” This is a reminder that the proconsul’s authority is challenged. It
implies a rather obvious question: What will the proconsul do about
it? Apuleius suggests an answer by telling a pertinent story in the life
of Aemilianus. He, apparently cut out of his uncle’s will, had claimed
that the will was false. Lollius Urbicus, praefectus urbi, aided by a panel of consulars, had judged it valid. Unwilling to acknowledge his defeat, Aemilianus persisted against this judgment so much “that only
with diﬃculty did Lollius Urbicus hold back from the man’s utter destruction” (pernicies. [2. 12]). This, then, is the man’s second oﬀense of
brazen repudiation of proper authority. He had missed his deserts the
ﬁrst time. What is to become of him now?
Another such suggestion is to be found in Apuleius’ treatment
of a part of the accusation. To make their accusation of magica maleﬁcia against Apuleius seem more credible, his attackers had included
the charge that he cut up ﬁshes for use as ingredients in magic potions. This dissection of ﬁsh, of course, he had done on the model of
Aristotle, whose works he wished to supplement and correct, in both
Greek and Latin (36. 1–6). To prove this, he has one of his admirers, who has a copy of Apuleius’ Natural History with him, look up

the chapters on ﬁsh to read to the court. “Meanwhile, as he looks for
the place, I will tell a story pertinent to the case” (‘exemplum rei pertinens’ [36. 8]).
The exemplum is the familiar story of Sophocles accused by his
son of dementia. As Apuleius tells it, Sophocles, accused by his own
son (emphasized in the Latin: “ﬁlio suomet,” [37. 1]), reads from his
latest work, Oedipus Coloneus, and tells the jurors they may convict
him if they do not like it. The jurors give the reading a standing ovation, and were of a mind to condemn the accuser of dementia instead
of the accused. This last is a major diﬀerence from the tradition recorded by Plutarch (Whether Old Men Should Govern, 3. 785.B)
and Cicero (De Sen. 7.22). Plutarch and Cicero anticipate Apuleius on all points of the tale, but are silent about the mood of the jurors toward the errant son. It seems signiﬁcant that Apuleius should
choose a version which has the accusing son all but convicted.1 Apuleius further implies that his own reading should do him a similar
amount of good: “Experiamur an et mihi possint in iudicio litterae
meae prodesse” (37. 4).
Apuleius’ charge of calumnia makes much use of a class of evidence generally deemed necessary in a prosecution. In ancient
courts it was always obligatory to show that the accused’s character was consistent with the crime he was supposed to have committed. Character evidence was direct and pertinent. Aristotle, perhaps
basing the statement on personal observation, declared “character is
the most eﬀective proof ” (Rhetoric 1.2.4: κυριωτάτην ’έχει πίστιν το

ή̃θος), and Roman legal practice followed his dictum.
Defending Fonteius, Cicero can repeatedly cite the prosecutor’s
silence with regard to the defendant’s character as an indication of
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1Another possibility is that Apuleius and Apuleius alone is responsible for this
variation in the story of Sophocles accused by his son. It was common for speakers
to edit their examples, the better to make a point. See Grundy Steiner, “Cicero as a
Mythologist,” CJ 63 (1968), pp. 195, 196, and M. M. Willcock, “Mythological Paradeigma in the Iliad,” CQ, 14 (1964) p. 141.
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innocence.1 In one such instance, the language is such as to imply
that omission of such evidence is a serious failing on the part of the
prosecution:

Itaque haec causa ab argumentis, a coniectura, ab iis
signis, quibus veritas illustrari solet, ad testes tota traducta est. (Pro Caelio 66) 1

M. Fonteius ita . . . accusatus est, ut obiectum nihil sit quo signiﬁcari vestigium libidinis, petulantiae, crudelitatis audaciae possit (15. 40).

The tradition does not seem to have ﬂagged.2 In any case, at the
time of Apuleius’ trial, the animus of the accused was still a certus index, and his natural bent for virtue or malice was still a “ﬁrmum argumentum accipiendi criminis aut respuendi”3 (90. 3).
In the light of this tradition, it becomes important to ask, “What
kind of man is Sicinius Aemilianus?” Also in the light of this tradition, it is neither unfair nor irrelevant for Apuleius to begin his
speech by answering: “A convicted perjurer” (2.9–3.3). It is, on the
contrary, a very appropriate beginning for a man who will accuse his
enemy of calumnia. It is similarly appropriate that Apuleius informs
the hearer in his ﬁrst sentence of the fact that Aemilianus is famous
for his temeritas. The ringleader, then, is a hardy liar. Herennius is
so shameless as to traﬃc in his wife and daughter. Pudens is depraved to the extent that he would bar his mother’s way with thugs
when she was attempting to attend his brother’s funeral. The “signs
by which the truth is always shown” (to use Cicero’s term for traits of
character) all suggest that this trio is perfectly capable of calumnia.
Thus Apuleius’ personal comments on the delinquents must be
reconsidered: viewed through the lens of established Roman legal
practice, the personal treatment Apuleius accords the trio is not to
be thought of in pejorative terms, but rather as a necessary concomitant to his accusation and prosecution of calumnia.

He deals with a similar omission in the prosecution of Flaccus
quum adolescentiam notaris, quum reliquum tempus aetatis turpitudinis maculis consperseris, quum
privatarum rerum ruinas, quum domesticas labes,
quum urbanam infamiam, quum Hispaniae, Galliae, Ciliciae Cretae, quibus in provinciis non obscure
versatus est, vitia et ﬂagitia protuleris, tum denique,
quid Tmolitae et Lorymeni de L. Flacco existiment
audiemus (2. 5).
The principal is explained in Pro Sulla:
Omnibus in rebus, iudices, quae graviores, maioresque sunt, quid quisque voluerit, cogitaret, admiserit, non ex crimine, sed ex moribus eius qui arguitur, est ponderatum. Neque enim potest quisquam
nostrum subito ﬁngi neque cuiusquam repente vita
mutari aut natura converti (25. 9).
There follows a list of criminals convicted less by their accusers than
by their own character. It is headed by Catiline (“Each of them was
condemned by his own life before he was condemned by your suspicion” [71]).
The tradition of the primacy of character evidence was such that
Cicero, beset by witnesses, can appeal to its greater force in the following terms:
1

Pro Font. 15. 34 and 35; 15. 38–40.

1 For a discussion on these four references to Cicero on character evidence, see J.
L. Strachan-Davidson, II, 119–121.
2

The jurist Callistratus (ﬂ. 200 a.d.) wrote: “Testium ﬁdes diligenter examinanda est ideoque in persona . . . utrum quis decurio an plebeius sit; et an honestae et
inculpatae vitae an vero notatus quis et reprehensibilis . . . ” Dig. 22.5.21.3.
3

Similarly, to accuse Apuleius of winning Pudentilla by magic, Aemilianus and
his allies were obliged to show that Apuleius’ character was low and his practice of
magic habitual; hence their personal attacks and the accessory charges of magic ﬁsh,
enchanted boys, night rites, etc. See pp. 50–85.

50

A POLOG Y as Prosecution

Apuleius’ Initial Review of the Charges (1-27)
Of principle importance to the charge of calumny, begun in the ﬁrst
sentence of the speech, is the demonstration that the charges are ﬁctitious. Apuleius’ attack is marked with the mordant wit of a man
who enjoys ﬂaying his slanderers. He asserts that Aemilianus can
knowingly (sciens again) accuse an innocent man the more easily,
since he has once already been convicted of perjury before the City
Prefect: pride, like cloth, can be treated more carelessly when it is already worn out (3. 1–3). Their charges are conﬁcta and blaterata, and,
equally important, extemporized (eﬀutierunt, [3. 6,7])1 by the sort of
lawyer whose custom is “to farm out the venom of his tongue for the
sake of someone else’s trouble” (“alieno dolore,” [3. 7]). Though Apuleius is accused of “magica maleﬁcia,” his accusers are the ones who
“. . . male facere coeperunt” (3. 10).
If Apuleius seems to be defending himself on inept and frivolous points, it is only because the accusation itself was inept and
frivolous. With this principle made clear (3. 12), Apuleius spends
the next several chapters in a humourous review of the entire accusation (3 – 27). Throughout this introductory section, Apuleius
creates a mood of amusement. Part of this is done simply by recollecting the various “inepta . . . et frivola” (3. 12) used against him,
and partly by mixing in several jokes and puns. Later the mood will
change to indignant anger, as he recounts the wrongs and insults the
accusers have inﬂicted upon him and his wife, but scornful laughter
keynotes the introduction.
The accusers had, for instance, stated that he had the wellprimped hair of a gigolo, apparently in support of their charge of
magical seduction. This is an “open lie” as anyone may see (4. 11). He
continues: “Satis, ut puto, crinium crimen, quod illi quasi capitale intenderunt, refutatur” (4. 12). This joke ends his discussion of the ﬁrst
1 Cf. Cic. Tusc. 5.88: “ex tempore quasi eﬀutire,” and Varro L. L. 7. 83 “Euax verbum nihil signiﬁcat, sed eﬀutitum naturaliter est.” It has other shades of meaning,
e.g. Non. p.103, 18 “Eﬀutire—cum mendacio dicere.” The word is rather uncommon; for the other usages, see TLL s.v.
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charge of the accusation. It neatly sets the mood for the speech and
prepares the reader—as it prepared the audience—for its content:
The only way the accusers could come up with a capital proof of
capital crime was to lie about his hair.
The accusation had begun “Accusamus apud te philo-sophum
formonsum et tam Graece quam Latine [“Pro nefas!” puns Apuleius] disertissimum” (4. 1). The pun is eﬀectively repeated at 5. 5,
where he uses a defence on the charge of bilingual eloquence as a
transition to another topic:
Eundem me aio facundissimum esse, nam omne
peccatum semper nefas habui; eundem disertis-simum, quod nullum meum factum vel dictum exstet,
de quo disserere publice non possim.
The next topic, Apuleius’ supposedly incriminating poetry, provides some evidence that Apuleius regarded the accusation as farcical. The following quotation continues from the one immediately
above:
ita ut iam de vorsibus dissertabo, quos a me factos
quasi pudendos protulerunt, cum quidem me animadvertistis cum risu illis suscensentem, quod eos
absone et indocte pronuntiarent (5. 6).
The verb is in the singular: Claudius Maximus himself is addressed.
He is thus called to witness for us that Apuleius’ reaction to at least
this part of the accusation consisted of laughter and anger, an indication that Apuleius is at least being consistent, and that the
laughter and indignation so obvious in the Apology were real, and
not mere tools of rhetoric. Further, the eyes of judge and accused
met when the accuser was exposing himself as an unlettered barbarian. The look that passed would have been one of an amused mutual
understanding.
The verses had been read to show that Apuleius compounded
a dentifrice from “Arabian herbs.” This was apparently to attempt
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to show that Apuleius was a practicing apothecary who, should the
need arise, would be capable of producing a magic brew. The dentifrice and the covering verses had been sent to one Calpurnianus, at
his request. Calpurnianus showed his gratitude by showing up at the
trial as a witness for Aemilianus. Apuleius reads the poem, demanding to know what there is in it to be ashamed of (6. 3–4)—“unless
I am perchance to be reproached for this, namely that I sent him a
mouthwash of exotic herbs, when using the famous mouthwash of
the Spaniards, urine, would have suited him much better!”1
The ﬁrst sentence of the next chapter provides two points of evidence. One shows how seriously Apuleius regards the trial; the second, how seriously the whole assemblage regards it. The one conﬁrms the other: “I saw certain people with diﬃculty restraining their
laughter

In hopes of damaging Apuleius, the accusers had read some amatory verses written by him. Adam Abt believes that these were offered as incantations, assuming that what Apuleius refers to as “versus, ut illi vocant, amatorios” (9. 1) had been in the accusation a
malum carmen, and another attempt to win love by magic.1 If the
poem in question had been oﬀered as evidence of magic, the attempt
met nothing but scorn from Apuleius. He made clear his contempt
for the idea that verses of any sort could have supernatural power,
and in so doing achieved one of his better puns: 2
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cum munditias oris videlicet orator ille aspere
accusaret—
That a pun on ‘munditias oris’ and ‘orator’ is intended seems supported by the fact that what the orator had read in the poem was “munditias dentium” (6. 3. line 2).
—et dentifricium tanta indignatione pronuntiaret,
quanta nemo quisquam venenum [7. 1].
Apuleius seems here to have gone out of his way to add more humor
to a point of the accusation which has already elicited laughter. The
remnant of the chapter is a slight dissertation on the suitability of
keeping one’s mouth clean. The absurdity of proﬀering mouthwash
as supporting evidence of magic is justly shown when Apuleius asks
Aemilianus if he ever washes his feet. Yes? Then why not wash your
mouth? But a dirty mouth suits the uses he puts it to, and it is a
“mendaciorum et amaritudinum praeministra” (8. 1–3). Even a beast
like the crocodile has concern to keep its mouth clean (8. 6–7).
1 This is not intended as a literal rendition of 6. 5. Here Apuleius ﬁts Catullus
39.19 into the text of his speech.
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‘fecit versus Apuleius!” Si malos, crimen est, nec id
tamen philosophi, sed poetae; sin bonos, quid accusas? (9. 4)
Apuleius reads the poems, showing the accusers how poetry should be read and showing that the poems are nothing for him
to be ashamed of. The poems he reads cannot be considered magical. They are verses in praise of boys, done with Anacreon, Alcman,
Simonides, Sappho, Valerius Aedituus, Porcius Licinius, Q. Lutatius Catulus, Solon, Diogenes, Zeno, Catullus, Ticidas, Propertius,
Tibullus, Lucilius, Vergil and Plato as precedents and models.
Since these three poems are obviously not “incantations,” Abt
would like to assume that the poems he reads are not the poems
he was accused of having written.3 Quite apart from the fact that
we may not so freely assume chicanery on the part of Apuleius (see
above, pp. 18–31) it is clearly shown in 11.1 that the poems had
been introduced as evidence, not of magic, but of low morals, an indication of how unlettered and desperate the accusers were:
Sed sumne ego ineptus, qui etiam haec in iudicio?
1

Abt, Apologie und Zauberei, pp. 22–23.

2

This is perhaps reminiscent of Horace, Sat. 2.1.81–86, where the poet humorously lets mala carmina mean both “libel” and “bad poetry.”
3 “Allein niemand burgt uns dafür, dass sie, das malum carmen und die von Apuleius vorgebrachten verse, wirklich identiﬁzierten. . . . ” op. cit., p. 23.
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an vos potius calumniosi, qui etiam haec in accusatione, quasi ullum speciem morum sit vorsibus ludere.
(11. 1)

into a farcical trial on magic, however. The joke was made possible
by the absurdity of the accusation, a fact which Apuleius duly and
promptly points out:

This passage also clariﬁes Apuleius’ purpose in reintroducing the poetic evidence against him: he uses it as an indication of how pointless and frivolous the accusation is, a reminder that the accusers are
calumniatores.
Apuleius provides brief notes about his poetic models in chapters ten and eleven, incidentally preserving for us seven elegiac lines
about boys written by Plato himself.1 He next discusses Plato’s Aphrodite Pahdemos and Aphrodite Ourania (12). The discussion leads to
the following remark, which seems a witty and justiﬁed eﬀort to
shrug the entire point oﬀ as an absurdity:

Should I call this the blindness of lying, or the habit? ‘Apuleius came to Oea with one slave!’ Then, after
a few babblings more [pauculis verbis intergarritis],
‘Apuleius freed three slaves one day in Oea’ (17. 4).
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Therefore, pardon Plato the philosopher for his amatory verses—or don’t: I will be guilty with Plato
(13. 1–2).
The accusing trio had apparently tried to present Apuleius as a
poor fortune hunter, adducing as evidence that he had come to Oea
with a single slave (17. 2). But later in the same speech, the lawyer for the plaintiﬀs had said Apuleius had manumitted three slaves
in one day. On the basis of these remarks, Apuleius makes a joke
against the accuser and against magic itself:
What I want you to tell me is this: when I have one
slave, how can I set three slaves free, unless this too
is magic? (17. 3)
Such a joke, whose point depends on the presupposition that there
is no such thing as magic, would hardly seem suitable in a serious
trial in which some danger existed. The joke would ﬁt rather neatly
1

10. 8–10. Plato was traditionally a poet as well as a philosopher (Diog. Laert.
3. 29–33; Suidas s.v. Plato), and the two love epigrams quoted here by Apuleius are
generally accepted as genuine works of Plato. Cf. Butler and Owen, Apology ad loc.
and J. M. Edmunds, Elegy and Iambus, II, 4–11.
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It is signiﬁcant that he should couch his query in such terms:
Whether their contradictory claims involve a lie is not in question;
it is obvious. What is in question is merely how the lie is to be classiﬁed. The charge would have been unbelievable enough, he asserts,
if he had had only three slaves and freed all of them, and, for that
matter, why should even three slaves be a sign of poverty rather than
three freedmen a sign of opulence? There follows a list of famous
men who held few slaves, a list whose point is that if Pudens knew
his history, he would prefer to reprehend three slaves as too opulent
for a philosopher than to reprehend them as a sign of poverty (17. 2)
which is nothing to be ashamed of (18).
As a further contumely, they had charged that his whole patrimony consisted of wallet and walking staﬀ. Apuleius would have
been satisﬁed with such a legacy, as the two items constituted the
insignia of the philosopher. But, as it turns out, the charges of poverty are false as well as pointless. Apuleius’ father had left his two sons
two million sesterces (23. 1). They had complained that he was some
barbarian, half-Gaetulian, half-Numidian (4. 1). Apuleius deals with
this in much the same way, but, as it is apparently true, he settles
for merely showing that it is no reproach. Was Cyrus the elder reproached for being half-Mede and half-Persian? (24. 2) Provenance
has little to do with human virtue (25. 5); Anacharsis the Wise was
from the dullard Scyths, and Meletides the Fool was from the keen
Athenians (24. 6). Apuleius gives a brief history of Madaura and his
father’s place in it (“in qua colonia patrem habui loco principis” [24.
9]). “Why have I dragged in this? So that you, Aemilianus, may not
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be so angry with me hereafter, or that you might even forgive me, if
by some negligence I did not choose to be born in that Attic Zarath
of yours” (24. 10).
He summarizes his reduction of the minor points of the accusation by showing that they are as absurd considered as a whole as
they were when considered singly. The summation begins with an
oﬀensive:

Apuleius next turns to the central charge of magic, “which was
ignited with a great tumult in order to defame me, frustrated everyone’s expectations through some old wives’ tales, and burned out”
(25. 5). He compares the accusation to a straw ﬁre with its crackling
noises, fast spread, radiant heat, and sudden end for lack of a more
substantial fuel, leaving not a trace:
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Aren’t you ashamed, adducing such charges so
strongly before such a man . . . ? Aren’t you accusing contrary things? Wallet and walking stick for
austerity, but mirror and verses for dissipation; one
slave for poverty, but three freedmen for prodigality,
and ﬁnally, eloquence in Greek matched with provenance for a barbarian! (25. 1–2)
Apuleius’ next question implies that such an accusation as this
has no place in a real law court: “Why don’t you wake up?”—a
question whose obvious point is that the accusing trio are dreaming. With consciousness regained, they are asked to take cognizance
of the seriousness of their situation, and realize that they are in the
presence of Claudius Maximus, “before a severe man, before a man
busy with the negotia of a whole province” (25. 3). Many of his negotia, of course, were court cases, for by this time the word had taken
on that meaning: Apuleius so uses it twice (41. 7; 51. 21). The Proconsul is busy enough with bona ﬁde cases that he ought not have to
bother with this one.
The challenge continues. “Why don’t you stop these empty mouthings [vana convicia]?” They have no other support, “Why
don’t you prove what you pretended, your ‘monstrous crimes, forbidden evils, unspeakable arts’?” (25.4) They cannot, as Apuleius implies
with the verb “insimulavistis,” which I have translated as “pretended.” The verb was especially used of a false accusation.1
1

Ernest Wolf, in the TLL s.v., summarizes a list of such usages with the deﬁnition “accusare . . . (maxime falsis criminibus).”
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Em tibi illa accusatio, iurgiis inita, verbis aucta, argumentis defecta, nullis post sententiam tuam reliquiis calumniae permansura (25. 5,6).
Since all the straw arguments of the calumnia were intended to show
him a magician, he asks his “most learned” accusers what a magician is. The question leads to a joke at the expense of the accusers,
a joke designed to show them as calumniatores. First, with some assistance from Plato (Charmides 157 A) Apuleius claims that in the
Persian, magus means priest, sacerdos, and “Quid tandem est crimen
sacer-dotem esse?” (25. 9) Or, if they do not like the Platonic magus, perhaps they prefer the common one, “who, by communion of
speech with immortal gods, holds power over everything he wishes,
through the incredible force of some incantations” (26. 6). If this is
their preference, he continues, “I marvel that they would dare accuse
someone so powerful.”
For such secret and divine power cannot be guarded
against like anything else: whoever hails an assassin
into court comes with a bodyguard; the accuser of a
poisoner eats with care; the accuser of a thief guards
his goods. But when you put their kind of magician
on trial for his life, what escort, what precautions or
bodyguards could keep oﬀ blind and inevitable destruction? None. Therefore this kind of accusation is
not his to make who actually believes it (26. 7–9).
If they do not believe their own accusation, it follows that the accusation is calumniosa. It is also to be noticed that this reduction to
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C HAPTER V

the absurd is a further indication that Apuleius is not a believer in
magic. The word he applies to the power of incantations is incredibilis (26.6; tr. above).
Their arguments, he repeats, are “vana et inepta” (27. 5). For the
sake of excoriating his enemies he lets’them pass in review:
“Why,” he asks, “were you looking for certain types
of ﬁsh?” As if you must not do for philosophy what
you may do for gourmandizing. “Why did a woman fourteen years a widow marry you?” Why not?
“Why, before the marriage, did she write such an
opinion in a letter?” As if I am responsible for someone else’s opinion. “But even though older, she did
not spurn the young man!” As if it took magic to
make a mature widow wed a young bachelor. And
others of the same ilk: “Apuleius has something at
home which he worships.” As if it were better to
worship nothing. “A boy fell down in the presence
of Apuleius!” What of it . . . ? Are these the arguments you prove magic with, a boy falling down, a
woman getting married, ﬁsh being sold? (27. 6–12)

T HE A CCESSORY C HARGES

A

fter the early summation of chapter twenty seven, Apuleius conﬁdently states that he could safely end his speech (28.
1). This conﬁdence is not noted by Apuleius’ modern accusers. Abt
found the Apology “nimble,”1 and since the publication of his Apologie und Zauberei (which, with Vallette’s L’Apologie forms the point
of departure for studies of the Apology), others have described the
speech as “nervous,”2 “scarcely convincing,”3 and “evasive.”4 The
purpose of this chapter is to test these judgments by checking them
against the sections of the Apology where Apuleius handles specific charges of magical practices (chapters 29–65). A fair reading of
these sections suggests not guilty nervousness, but indignant retaliation; not evasiveness, but vindictive sarcasm, and ﬁnally, in return for
the baseless accusation of magic, an often repeated counter-accusation of calumnia, justiﬁed, but unoﬃcial.
Despite his statement that he could safely end his speech, Apuleius continues, possibly because he feels his enemies have not yet
been suﬃciently roasted. Indeed, in view of the way the accusers are
exposed and their calumnia proven after this summation, the accusers would have been pleased if the matter had gone no further and
they had been left alone, like the defendants of Kelly’s deﬁnition,
in which “. . . only one of the parties [the plaintiﬀ ] is anxious to
press ahead with the matter, while the other [the defendant] would
1

Abt, Apologie und Zauberei, p. 259.

2

Kelly, Roman Litigation, p. 54.

3

A. J. Festugiere, Personal Religion among the Greeks, p. 76.

4

Pack, “Adventures of a Dilettante,” CJ 35 (1939), p. 79.
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be pleased if it went no further . . . .” 1
Apuleius has two years of constant defamation and harassment
to repay with this speech, and he will not let them oﬀ so easily. He
toys with each point of the accusation rather unmercifully before administering the coup de grace. Ambulando, he continues making jokes
and reductions to the absurd. Such an obvious case of calumnia elicits and deserves them. It is important to notice this technique of
Apuleius, for his sport with the charges has led to modern accusations of “evasion,” and the evasion has been used to argue that Apuleius was really in some way a magician. After the work of Abt, Vallette, Norden, and Ussani, Pack can say: “It seems undeniable that
he had actually dabbled to some extent in the black arts . . . . The
evasiveness with which he handles this ﬁrst part of the accusation
is unmistakable.”2 But Apuleius’ treatment of the charges is better
thought of as disdainful humor than as guilty evasion.

which of these pertains to magic? that I sought the
ﬁsh from ﬁshermen? But of course—I should have
sought them from a seamstress or a carpenter if I
had wanted to avoid your calumniae, and had them
change jobs, so the carpenter would catch my ﬁsh,
and the ﬁsher do my woodwork (29. 1–3).
In the attack, Apuleius “touches all the bases,” holding the charge up
to ridicule from every point. This is done climactically, with each argument a little more cogent and a little more damning than the last:
But perhaps it was from this that you understood
a crime, that I sought the ﬁsh for a price? I do believe if I had wanted them for a party I could have
got them for nothing. Why don’t you argue against
me from several other purchases? For I have even
bought fruits and vegetables and bread and wine
(29. 4-5).

Allegedly Magic Fish
This disdainfully humorous manner in toying with the accusation, and attacking it, is evident as Apuleius begins with the charge
which the accusers had treated as their strongest support, the matter of the ﬁsh. They had demanded to know why he purchased and
dissected ﬁsh if it was not for the making of philtres. Even though
Apuleius had a perfectly good answer to the question, he refuses to
let it out until he has done all he can to make sport of the accusers and their absurd charge. Like all the other charges, it is a deliramentum (29. 1):
. . . beginning with the charge which, as you noticed, they treated from the start as the strongest
argument for the suspicion of magic, that I bought
some species of ﬁsh from ﬁshermen for a price. But
1

J. M. Kelly, Roman Litigation, p. 4. The text is more fully cited above, pp.
45–46.
2

Pack, op. cit., pp. 78-79.
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Who would dare shop for groceries if it were decreed that all edibles
gotten for money were intended for magic instead of for dinner?
He leaves the matter of purchase, and attacks the charge on
another front, to charge that the accusers are either magicians or
calumniatores:
But I ask you, is a man a magician for seeking ﬁsh?
Certainly I do not think so, any more than if I were
hunting rabbits, boars, or birds. But perhaps ﬁsh have
something secret from others, and known to magicians? If you know what it is, you are a magician; if
you do not know, you are obliged to confess that you
do not know what you are accusing me of (30. 1–2).
Apuleius informs us that the accusers provided no precedent of ﬁsh
being used for magic. 1 This indicates that even among the four of
1

They are challenged to produce one at 29. 9.
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them, Pudens, Aemilianus, Herennius, and the lawyer Tannonius,
there was no precedent known—which in turn indicates that the
second of the two alternatives is the correct choice.
They could have come up with a more likely story if even they
had read Vergil (e.g. Ecl. 8. 64–67; Aen 4. 513–516). Apuleius ﬁlls
two chapters with precedents for the magical use of terrestrial plants
and animals (30 and 31), to show how much better a fabrication they
could have made if they were only literate. The purpose, of course, is
to remind everyone that the accusation is a false one. He especially reminds the audience of the deceptive basis of the accusation in
chapter thirty (the reader will recall the fraudulent use of Pudentilla’s letter):
I would recite similar passages from Theocritus,
Homer, Orpheus, and I could recite several from
Greek comedy, tragedy, and history, except that I
noticed a short time ago that you could not read
Pudentilla’s Greek correspondence. Therefore, I will
cite just a Latin poet . . . . (30. 11–12)
He then quotes Laevius, but proceeds to add two snippets of Homer anyway (31. 5–7). The whole series of models prepares the way for
another reductio leveled against the “piscium insimulator”:
Therefore, as magicians summon Mercury . . . Venus
. . . and Hecate, henceforth, on your authority they
will transfer Neptune, Salacia, Portunus and the
whole chorus of Nereids from the storms at sea to
the storms of love (31. 9).
As if the authority of such a cheat were ﬁt company for that of Vergil, Theocritus, Orpheus, Greek comedy, tragedy and history, Laevius, Pythagoras and Homer!
Apuleius grants that ﬁsh may be used for magic. “Let’s believe
it.” Does it then follow that every purchaser of ﬁsh is a magician?
By such reasoning, “the buyer of a swift ship is a pirate? the buyer of
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a crowbar, a burglar; the buyer of a sword, an assassin” (32. 1). This
leads to another challenge whose point is that the piscium insimulator is guilty of a calumnia which ought not be tolerated:
‘Why do you seek ﬁsh?’ I don’t want to answer and
I don’t have to. You answer. If I bought hellebore,
hemlock, or poppy juice . . . whose moderate dosage
is salutary, but which are poison in overdose or mixtures, who would allow it with tranquillity, if you
were on this count to charge me with poison, because the items are potentially lethal? (34. 7–8)
It is apparent that the refusal to answer is not evidence of evasiveness, but rather the act of a man who is in no danger and is attacking his accuser, who should be in danger.1
He attacks the charge on another front. He had, according to
them, especially sought three species of ﬁsh. “one of these was mistaken; the other two were lies” (33. 2). They had incorrectly identiﬁed one. His “most clever accusers” had thought up the other two
“ad ﬁnem calumniae” (33. 5). The charge was that he had taken ﬁsh
called virile and feminal for a philtre. Tannonius Pudens, the opposition lawyer, aﬀected shame on approaching the utterance of the
word “feminal” and pointedly took refuge in a work (quodam libro
meo) of Apuleius, where, as Apuleius explains, a statue of Venus is
described: “She hides her interfeminium with raised thigh and veiling hand” (33. 7). This part of the accusation, as Apuleius points out,
tells us something about the accusation and the accusers. He calls it
“a charge which ﬁts your stupidity as well as it ﬁts your tongue.”
For what is more stupid [stultius ] than the similar force
of things supposed from the likeness of their names?
1

Apuleius has a valid answer to the charge (cf. p. 64 below); if he were being
evasive, it would only be through fear: if he is afraid, why does he not give his valid
answer straight out? His extreme delay of the answer shows that he was unafraid,
and more interested in condemning enemies than in giving the satisfactory proof of
innocence, which he can do whenever he wants to.
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Perchance you think yourselves clever . . . . But remember that the argument of obscene ﬁsh for love aﬀairs is
as laughable as if you had said the seacomb was sought
for better grooming, or the hawk-ﬁsh for falconry, or the
boarﬁsh for hunting wild pigs, or the calvary ﬁsh for raising the dead (34. 5–6).
The point is, in sum, “non minus insulse quam absurde commentum”
(34. 7). Even the more, since the “frivolous ﬁsh” which they name lie
in heaps on the shores, and Apuleius might as well have paid ﬁshermen “a great price” to collect smoothed stones, worn potsherds, crayﬁsh claws, and algae (35. 3). Even such rubbish as this would have
served them equally well: “Qui minus possit ex eodem litore calculus
ad vesicam, testa ad testamentum, cancer ad ulcera, alga ad quercerum? (35. 6)
There immediately follows some praise for Claudius Maximus,
who can stoically endure even a farce like this without losing his
composure:

tions to ichthyology, and his preservation of the only extant passage
of Ennius’ Hedyphagetica, Apuleius returns to ridicule. It is ridicule,
however, in which we may see evidence of a long built up, indignant anger which may approach virulence: “‘You cut up a ﬁsh!’ Who
would tolerate such a charge against a philosopher, which would be
no charge at all against a butcher or a cook? ‘You cut up a ﬁsh!’ Are
you blaming me because it was raw? If it were cooked and I prowled
through its belly and stabbed its liver—as that boy Pudens learns to
do on his own ﬁsh at your example—you would not think that actionable” (41. 2).
The remaining remarks on the topic of ﬁsh all insist that the
accusation is, at best, substandard. “You blame in me, what Maximus and I admire in Aristotle? Unless you burn his books in the
libraries and wrench them from the hands of students, you cannot accuse me” (41. 1). The circumstances of the trial obliged some
haste, and the accusation was apparently beset with chronological
problems:
See further, how they contradict themselves: they
say I sought after a woman with magic and the seductions of the sea, at a time when they will not
deny I was in the mountains of Gaetulia—where
ﬁsh are to be found from the deluge of Deucalion!
(41. 5)

Ah, Claudius Maximus, you are a very patient man,
and surely of the greatest reﬁnement, since you have
endured these argumentations of theirs so long; indeed,
when these topics were argued as if serious and cogent,
I was laughing at their stupidity, and admiring your polite restraint.
Finally, Apuleius explains his perfectly legitimate interest in
ﬁsh: he has been supplementing and correcting Aristotle, who served
as a model for his own investigations. He proves this by bringing in
his publication, Quaestiones Naturales (36). The manner in which he
introduces this work is of some importance: “Please allow certain
sections to be read from my magic book . . . ” (“de magicis meis,” 35.
7) . This is the sarcasm of indignant scorn, and is not consistent with
the fear of punishment which leads to evasiveness.
After the exemplum of Sophocles and his all-but-condemned
accusing son (treated above, p. 47), a summary of his own contribu-
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He is especially pleased—since his fondness for Aristotle was
the root of his problem with ﬁsh—that they do not know he has
read Nicander’s Θηριακά and Theophrastus’ Περ`ι Δακέτων κα`ι
Βλητικω̃ν, or they would have accused him of poisoning as well
(41. 6). His last word on the matter of ﬁsh is a punning transition
to the next topic: “Now, since these people’s ﬁsh have lain in the
open long enough . . . .”1

1

Nunc quoniam pisces horum satis patuerunt . . . 42. 1.
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ation by enchantment; for that Thallus you named
needs a doctor more than a magician. The poor
thing is so worn by epilepsy that he often collapses three or four times a day without enchantments.
He is weak in all his limbs from spasms, his face is
full of sores, his head is scarred from concussions,
his eyes are listless, his nostrils are ﬂared, his feet
are unsteady. The greatest magician on earth is one
in whose presence Thallus would stand ﬁrm (43.
7–10).

Two “Enchanted” Epileptics
Raw ﬁsh, suﬃciently exposed, are very properly abandoned, and Apuleius turns from them to “another charge of equal stupidity [pari
stultitia], but much more vainly and wantonly thought up” (multo
tanta vanius et nequius excogitatum [42. 1]). This charge was that he
had enchanted a boy in a secret place, in the presence of lamplight
and few witnesses. As a result, they claimed, the boy had fallen and,
on being wakened, remembered nothing. “Nor did they dare go any
further in the lie, for to ﬁnish the tale, they should have added that
the same boy uttered several oracles” (42. 3). This, he explains, is a
traditional emolument for enchantment; presagement and divination, recorded not only by the credulous commons, but also by the
learned. He then cites two examples of such divination from Varro.
One boy staring at a Mercury, set in a basin of water, predicted the
outcome of the battle of Tralles in the Mithridatic war. Other boys
inspired by Nigidius were able to tell Fabius where to ﬁnd his lost
ﬁve hundred denarii (42. 5–8).
Apuleius oﬀers a polite disclaimer1 of credence, and then propounds a theory on the basis of divination from Plato (Sym. 202E,
Apol. 43. 1–2), and describes the kind of boy suitable for divine
inspiration:
debet ille . . . puer providus . . . corpore decorus
atque integer, et animo sellers et ore facundus
. . . (43. 4).
In short, the requisite is a worthy abode for the “divine power:” “It
is not of just any wood, as Pythagoras used to say, that a Mercury
should be made” (43. 4–6).
If that is the case, name that boy sane, ﬂawless, brilliant, handsome, whom I deemed worthy of initi1 Stoics generally put much faith in divination (Cic. De Div. passim) and if
Claudius Maximus was the Stoic tutor of Marcus Aurelius, there was no point in

antagonizing him.
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Thallus’ ailment was known to the slaves of accuser and accused.
No one dared to eat or drink from a plate or glass which Thallus had
used. The accusers were themselves aware that Thallus was epileptic, and that he had customarily been shown to doctors even before
Apuleius’ arrival (44. 1–3). Thus the accusation that Apuleius had resorted to magic to eﬀect the boy’s fall the one time he fell in Apuleius’ presence was no innocent mistake.
This magical act was witnessed—or at least the accusers wished
to give this impression. They had summoned ﬁfteen slaves to testify
at the trial, including Thallus, even though they knew he had long
since been quarantined far oﬀ in the country. Apuleius had sent a
carriage for him, but this had not arrived in time. But the fourteen
other slaves, who were all in town, were present and capable of verifying everything Apuleius had said about the boy Thallus (44. 4–7).
Apuleius makes much of the fact that they had not put the fourteen
slaves to the question. It is with some justice that he does: refusal to
put to the question slaves who have pertinent information had been
a standard argument of bad faith (if Greek precedent may be included) for more than six hundred years.1
1

The earliest instance I am aware of is Lysias, 4. See Robert J. Bonner, Evidence
in Athenian Courts, p. 70. Cf. Cic, Pro Rosc. 41. 120: “Quod a vobis oppugnari video, ne in quaestionem dentur [servi], suspiciosum est; quod vero apud vos ipsos in
honore tanto sunt, profecto necesse est sciant aliquid, quod si dixerint, perniciosum
vobis futurum sit.”
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Apuleius summarizes the matter with another accusation of
calumnia:
Fourteen servants whom you demanded I exhibit. Why
don’t you have them questioned? One boy you require,
and that one an epileptic whom you know as well as I to
have been long absent. What more obvious proof is there
of calumnia? (45. 1)
Do they wish to prove that the boy fell in Apuleius’ presence? Apuleius admits it. Do they wish to prove that the boy fell because of enchantment? Nonsense. Why attribute the fall to charms rather than to
disease? Why cannot the same thing happen in the presence of Apuleius which has so often occurred in the presence of others? Why use
charms to fell an epileptic when a jetstone or a turning potter’s wheel
would do it so much more easily? 1
The lie was not only generally recognized by the assemblage, but
was met with raised eyebrows and audible displeasure: “. . . cum hoc
quoque mendacium frigere ac prope iam omnium vultu et murmure
explosum videret . . . ” (46. 1). Thus cut short, Tannonius Pudens,
speaker for the accusers, attempted to calm the audience by promising to produce other boys also enchanted by Apuleius (46. 1), and
so quickly stepped to another argument. But Apuleius will not let
this point pass. ‘Quod quamquam dissimulare potui, tamen, ut omnia, hoc quoque provoco” (46. 2). He then twice requests that they
produce their enchanted boys. His third request takes the form of
an oﬃcial summons: “Postulo igitur et ﬂagito, Tannoni Pudens, ut
expleas quod pollicitus es” (46. 3). Postulatio technically is the word
given the initial act of a procedure, and was also the word used of
summoning evidence into court. 2 As has been noted above (p. 37),
1 Slave dealers used this stone to “weed out” epileptics; the turning wheel was to induce vertigo, and to upset the already unstable balance of the epileptic—Apol. 45. 4-5.
2

The word is used both ways by Apuleius. Cf. Apol. 2. 9; 41. 6; 54. 3; 74. 5; 79. 3,
and 90. 2 for postulatio as indictment. For postulatio as the summoning of evidence
into court, cf. Apol. 45. 1; 45. 6; 47. 1 (bis), also P. Collinet, La Procédure par Libelle,
pp. 244–245, where he cites Justinian CI 7. 39. 9. 1.
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ﬂagitatio is a public denunciation of a delinquency (in this case, the
statement that he can produce several boys enchanted by Apuleius) whose purpose was to shame the delinquent into restitution or
to submit to litigation. Of course Apuleius does not expect them
to produce their boys. Clearly his purpose in putting emphasis on
his demand, and couching the demand in oﬃcial terms, is to punish
them for the perjury with long moments of embarrassed anguish.
He repeats the request a fourth, ﬁfth, sixth and a seventh time:
Cedo pueros istos quibus conﬁdistis; produc! Nomina qui sint. Mea aqua licet ad hoc utare. Die, inquam, Tannoni! (46. 3)
The answer was important, and Apuleius delights in pointing out
what it means. It was an embarrassed silence: “Quid taces? Quid
cunctaris? Quid respectas?” (46. 4) Tannonius has apparently forgotten his lesson; Apuleius turns upon Aemilianus: “But if he does not
know what you taught him, or has forgotten the names, you, Aemilianus, come here, tell us what you turned over to your lawyer. Exhibit your boys!” (46. 4) Aemilianus gives the same answer and receives
the same treatment: “Quid expalluisti? Quid taces?” His commentary on their answers is worth reviewing in full:
Is this accusing? Is this prosecuting a great charge?
Or isn’t it rather treating Claudius Maximus, a great
man, with mockery and harassing me with calumnia (46. 5).
But if they “misspoke” and have no boys to show, why don’t
they use the fourteen which Apuleius exhibits? (46. 6) They summoned ﬁfteen slaves for an accusation of magic. How many would
they have summoned for an accusation of inciting to riot? This introduces another dilemma: “Fifteen slaves know something, and
yet it is secret. Or is it not secret and yet magic? You must allow
one or the other. Either the deed in which I did not fear ﬁfteen
conscii was legitimate, or it was illegal and they shouldn’t have been
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there” (47. 2). There follows a brief disquisition on the necessity of
keeping illegal magic secret (47. 2–4), which is in turn followed by
a series of questions:
. . . and you want ﬁfteen slaves to have been present?
Perhaps it was a wedding? Some crowded sollemnity? A party? Did ﬁfteen slaves take part in a magic rite,
as if enrolled as ‘Quindecimviri Sacris Faciundis’?(47. 5)
They had added that a free woman—suﬀering from the same
ill as Thallus—was brought to Apuleius, and, at his incantation, fell.
To which he remarks: “It seems to me you came to accuse a wrestler,
not a magician—according to you, everyone who comes to me has
a fall” (48. 2). Themison, the physician who brought her to Apuleius for consultation (47. 3; 48. 11; 51. 9) was questioned by Claudius
Maximus himself about the incident. He reported that Apuleius had
asked if her ears rang, and if so, which one the more. She answered
that they did, and that the right one rang so much it bothered her.
This satisﬁed Apuleius that her case was incurable, and ended this
particular patient-physician relationship.1 The proconsul questioned
Tannonius, too. Apuleius praises his perspicacity in the matter, thus
preserving for us the following dialog:
Claudius Maximus: Why did Apuleius charm her?
Tannonius: So she would fall.
Claudius Maximus: What then? Is she dead?
Tannonius: No.
Claudius Maximus: Well, what are you saying, then?
What good would it do Apuleius if she fell? (48. 6–7)
After reminding Claudius Maximus (who knows) of the philosophical and medical basis for his questioning of the epileptic woman—
from Plato, Aristotle, and Theophrastus (49–51. 8)—he returns to
the attack:
1

The abrupt end of her treatment is appropriate to a Platonist physician. Plato
would have his physicians waste no time “coddling” incurables (Republic 3 406C f.).
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Therefore . . . let them either establish that caring
for the sick is characteristic of a criminal magician
[ magi et maleﬁci hominis ] or, if they will not allow
this, let them admit that in the matter of the epileptic boy and woman they have proﬀered vain and epileptic calumniae (51. 9).
Apuleius has by this time constructed a rather strong case
against his calumniatores, and he now devotes an entire chapter to
the accusation of calumnia.
But if you want the truth, Aemilianus, you are yourself the epileptic, as you have now slipped and fallen
on so many calumniae (52. 1).
It seems unlikely that Apuleius could say this if it were not by this
time obvious to all that the accusation was calumniosa, Indeed, the
good eﬀect of Apuleius’ exposure may be seen in the next sentence:
For it is no more serious to be failing in body than
to be failing at heart; better to lose one’s footing
than one’s mind; better to be spat upon in the sickroom than to be detested [detestari] in this most
splendid assemblage (52. 1).
He continues, showing how Aemilianus’ falsehoods leave him in
worse and more serious condition than Thallus:
But perhaps you think yourself healthy because you
are not conﬁned at home, but are free to follow your
disease wherever it leads you. But, if you please,
compare your ill with that of Thallus. You will ﬁnd
that there is not much diﬀerence, except that Thallus rages against himself; you, against others as well.
Thallus rolls his eyes; you roll the truth. Thallus is
spastic in his limbs; you are spastic with your lawyers. Thallus falls on pavements; you fall on forums.
Finally, whatever he does, he does in innocence and
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ignorance. But you, miser, consciously and knowingly commit wrong, so great is the strength of the
rabidity which drives you: You insist that the false
is true; you charge what was not done was done:
Whom you clearly know innocent, you accuse as
guilty (52. 2–4).
Apuleius continues this accusation of calumnia in his next chapter,
where the topic for discussion is something that Apuleius kept hidden in a handkerchief.
The Mysterious Handkerchief
The critic who ﬁnds Apuleius’ evasiveness “unmistakable” ﬁnds Apuleius’ handkerchief “for a time almost as incriminating as Desdemona’s.”1
Desdemona’s handkerchief, one recalls, was strong enough evidence to
condemn its owner (falsely) to death. But there is little damning in these
chapters—or at least nothing damning of Apuleius. The section on the
handkerchief is rather a multifarious reduction, entertaining and acid, but
no more vitriolic than valid. The absurdity of the charge is clearly shown
from the start:
What you admit you do not know you accuse me of
anyway, as though you did, for you say I had something wrapped in a kerchief at Pontianus’. You grant
your ignorance of the identity of the enveloped objects, and grant likewise that you know no one who
has seen them; yet you declare that they were instruments of magic . . . . Before such a grave and perspicacious judge, you used practically these very words:
“Apuleius had something wrapped up in linen before the Lares of Pontianus. Since I do not know
what this might have been, I therefore contend that
1

R. A. Pack, “Adventures of a Dilettante in a Provincial Family,” CJ, 35 (1939),
78. Pack does, however, seem satisﬁed with A.’s explanation that its contents were
souvenirs of initiation to the mysteries of Dionysius.
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it is magical in nature. Trust therefore what I say,
because I speak of what I am not sure.” What an argument! What a paradox! “This was, because I don’t
know what it was!” (53. 1–5)
As though not satisﬁed with this, Apuleius attacks the matter
on another front: the handkerchief lay in Pontianus’ library; the librarian had the key to the room, and was alone in it as often as not.
The handkerchief was not sealed, nor was it tied. “Why not? magical things were hidden in it—that is why I kept it negligently; that
is why I exposed it so anyone could see it, inspect it, or steal it; that
is why I entrusted it to someone else’s care and someone else’s judgment” (53. 8–9).
He attacks again: Pontianus had been his closest friend. Yet
Pontianus never saw the contents of the handkerchief; neither did
his librarian. “Do you expect us to believe that you know the contents, you whom I never see except in court?” (53. 10) .
Even if they could think up something that might seem magical, they could get nowhere with it: it could have been substituted, taken as a remedy, received at a sacrament, or commanded by a
dream, or any other of “a thousand things widespread and in current
usage” (54. 1–2).
Still not satisﬁed, Apuleius puts to his accusers another dilemma, one whose point is that they do not know what they are talking
about. They do not know what is in the kerchief? Why don’t they
ask?
I suppose you might say again, after your custom,
“What was it, then, that powerful thing covered in
linen, which you placed before the Lares?” Isn’t this
the way it is, Aemilianus? Thus you accuse, that you
may learn everything from the defendant, while
you oﬀer nothing yourself which is known for sure.
“Why did you hunt ﬁsh? Why did you examine a
sick woman? What did you have in your kerchief?”
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Did you come to accuse or ask? If to accuse, support
what you say; if to ask, don’t prejudge what your ignorance forced you to ask about (54. 4–5).
Apuleius’ next argument is that everyone can be accused if the
calumniator is allowed to ask at will without being obliged to prove.
There is nothing so innocent that an insinuating question cannot be
asked about it: “‘You wrote a vow on the leg of a statue; therefore
you are a magician or why did you write it? In a temple you said silent prayers to the gods; you are therefore a magician, or what did
you pray for?’ Or, on the other side of the coin, ‘You made no prayer
in the temple; you are therefore a magician, or why didn’t you pray
to the gods?’ By this same line of reasoning,” Apuleius concludes,
“whatever is kept at home shut, shelved, or sealed will be especially
cited as magical, or brought from its safe into the open and up for
judgment. “The day would not last long enough for me to list all the
similar charges a calumniator could make” (54. 6–8).
He continues teasing and twitting Aemilianus, in whose accusation, Apuleius has told us, there is only “furor infelix acerbi animi
et misera insania crudae senectae” (53. 3). He ﬁnishes by simply explaining that the kerchief contained the oﬃcial souvenir of his Dionysiac initiation, and every initiate knows what that is (55. 8 and
56. 1). A judge less lenient than Claudius Maximus found this explanation itself quite suﬃcient.1 Why, then, all the preliminary and
perhaps even superﬂuous argumentation? Perhaps because (as was
suggested above, pp. 7–8) Apuleius has been oﬀered an opportunity to horsewhip, publicly and verbally, his most vicious enemy. He
did not let the opportunity pass, and is now doing a thorough job of
it. As the trial oﬀered Apuleius no danger, he was quite free to devote more of his oration to the destruction of Aemilianus than to
the establishment of his innocence, innocence which the judge never
doubted.
1

Pack, op. cit. p. 78.
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Nocturnal Rites
We may sympathize with a man who was accused of magic because
his enemies did not know what he had in his handkerchief. Indeed,
if Aemilianus’ techniques were allowed, “What a ﬁeld would be open
for caTumhial” (55. 1) As is his custom, Apuleius switches from one
topic to another with a bit of levity:
As I believe I have satisﬁed even the most prejudiced, and—with regard to the handkerchief—
scrubbed away every spot of accusation, I will now
turn, bono periculo, to that testimony of Crassus,
which they read as though it were rather serious
(57. 1).
This testimony was that Apuleius “was constantly conducting nocturnal rites” with Appius Quintianus, his friend who had at one
time rented a room from one Crassus. Crassus knew this because
when he returned from Alexandria, he saw smoke on the walls in
the vacated room and feathers scattered over the ﬂoor (57. 2; 58. 2).
He asked his slave, whom he had left in Oea, the reason for the soot
and feathers, and was told of the magic rites of Apuleius and Appius. Thus, through his written testimony, Crassus explained how he
knew of rites performed in Oea when he was in Alexandria.
Since Crassus’ letting a room to Appius was probably his only
connection with Apuleius, any story he could compose would necessarily have concerned events allegedly taking place while Appius
stayed there, even if he, Crassus, were absent for the duration of Appius’ stay. Any story he could compose, then, would necessarily be
founded on the condition of the room on his return.
Because Apuleius’ arguments against the testimony are entirely matter of ridicule, his modern accusers have freely taken the testimony as valid, and have, like Sicinius Aemilianus, seen dire and
magical things in the soot and feathers,1 as though soot and feathers
1 See, for example, Abt, op. cit., pp. 217–221, and Herrmann, “Le Proces
d’Apulée,” pp. 332–333.
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had actually been left in the room. But is it not possible that Apuleius subjects the testimony of Crassus to ridicule and reduces it to the
absurd precisely because the testimony of Crassus was ridiculous and
absurd? If the testimony was worth the credence of Claudius Maximus—and of modern critics—and was oﬀered in good faith out of
conviction rather than for cash out of greed, why did not Crassus
show up at the trial to acknowledge the testimony as his own and to
defend it?
In the Athenian courts, the evidence of witnesses was written
and deposited beforehand, read at the request of the orators, and validated by its author, who acknowledged it as his own.1 The Roman
system was somewhat diﬀerent, though it, too, had its safeguards
against outright manufacture of written evidence. Written testimony
of an absent witness could be brought into evidence if accompanied
by the seals of seven witnesses, who swore, not to its truth, but to the
fact that the person named actually had made the deposition in their
presence. The signatores were but a substitute for the presence of the
witness.2 Procedure became more rigorous with time. Even during
the Republic, when the author of written evidence happened to be
present, he was expected to stand in acknowledgement that the testimony being read was his own.3 But in the Empire, unacknowledged testimony became more suspect, and eventually, unacceptable.
Quintilian, for instance, states that it is open to the advocate to impugn the testimony of absent witnesses, for three reasons: such evidence is always given willingly, and so the witness might be supposed to be the enemy of him against whom it is given; a man will
lie more readily before his seven witnesses than before a full court,
and his absence may be attributed to his not daring to stand the test
of cross-examination (Inst. 5.7.1–2). Such evidence had become unacceptable as early as the time of Hadrian; a would-be accuser bas1

Dem. 45.44; 47.48: Isae. 6.11. Cf. also G. P. Bristol, Ten Orations of Lysias, pp.
166–167, and Bonner, Evidence in Athenian Courts, pp. 46–47.
2

Strachan-Davidson, p. cit. vol. 2, p. 116 and n.

3

Cic. Pro Cluentio 60.168; 69. 196.
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ing his case upon depositions of absent witnesses met a denegatio actionis. The Digest (22.5.3.3) cites Hadrian’s explanation:
. . . because he produced neither proof nor witnesses, but wished to employ written statements, which I
do not admit, for my practice is to question the witnesses
themselves.
It is possible that Hadrian’s own courtroom practice was prescribed
for general use in his lost Edictum Perpetuum. This we cannot know;
it is more important that Claudius Maximus had this recent imperial precedent to follow, and seems to have followed it. Apuleius provides evidence throughout the Apology that the proconsul himself
has questioned all the witnesses.1 The witness like Crassus would
have known from this precedent that his absence would have the effect of denying his deposition. Crassus’ failure to appear thus suggests what he thought of his own testimony. Two questions of Apuleius support this view by implying that the accusers were out of order in reading an unacknowledged deposition:
But why did you read the deposition? Where is
Crassus himself? (59. 1)
In sum, the original and the modern accusers of Apuleius ask us
to disdain the honesty of Apuleius in favor of an unknown who
thought so little of his own testimony that he did not bother to
come and defend it. Merchants best know the value of their own
wares, and if Crassus put no faith in his own testimony, why should
we? Even if we could assume that Crassus’ deposition was oﬀered in
good faith, it would remain one man’s report of something that his
slave had told him.
It would be better, then, to credit Apuleius, and assume that this
charge, like the others, is conﬁctum ac blateratum. Like the others, it
is treated with caustic humor. The ﬁrst chapter on the nocturnal rites
attacks it on the grounds cited above, i.e., that it is a second-hand re1

E.g., 48. 3; 48. 5-8; 48. 10; 61. 5; 62. 1; 98. 9; 101. 7.
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port. “This Crassus states, even though he had been in Alexandria at
the time, he nonetheless found out about the soot and feathers. Perhaps when he was carousing there—for this is the same Crassus who
frequents brothels in broad daylight—he managed, in the redolence
of a saloon, to recognize the feathers plucked at his own hearth, and
the smoke rising from the paternal roof ” (57. 2–4). What a talent!
He had the eyes the captive Ulysses prayed for. But Ulysses scanned
the sky for years, Apuleius recalls, without seeing the smoke of the
home ﬁres. “But Crassus can see the same smoke after a few months’
absence, and without getting up oﬀ his bar stool!” (57. 4). Such a
nose allows Apuleius to compare him favorably to a dog or a vulture
(57. 5). But this is unfair, for Crassus has the advantage of them, as
he is an “expert gourmand and a connoisseur of every smell” (57. 6).
“But,” muses Apuleius, “considering the study of drink, which is his
ﬁeld, the aura of wine had a better chance to reach him at Alexandria than the aura of smoke” (57. 6).
The second chapter on the nocturnal rites (58) is devoted to
demonstrating the absurdity of the testimony. Like most chapters
of the Apology, it is ﬁlled with challenging questions. Why should
Apuleius have performed the “magic” in Appius’ room rather than
at home? Supposing there were feathers from either a dinner, or, as
they would have it, from a nocturnal rite, did Appius have no slave
to sweep them up? (58. 3–5). The walls were blackened with the
soot. Would Appius have tolerated this while he lived there? (58. 6)
How did Crassus’ clever slave ﬁgure out that the smoke was from a
night-time ﬁre? Is night soot darker than day soot? 1 Why did this
slave, at once so suspicious and diligent, allow Appius to move before cleaning up? Why did the feathers, as if leaden, await so long
1

58. 8. L. Herrmann would invalidate this question: “Pourtant, il est clair que
c’est seulement la nuit qu’en a eu a servir de ﬂambeaux qui ont encrassés les murs.”
“Le Procès d’Apulee: fut-il un Procès de Christianisme?” RUB n.s. 4, (1951–1952),
p. 333. Does Professor Herrmann know that the apartment had windows so it
needed no ﬂames during the day? Does he know that cooking ﬁres were burned
only after dark?
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the arrival of Crassus? “But Crassus ought not blame his servant
on this account, for he himself lied about soot and feathers because,
even in giving testimony, he is unable to wander far from the kitchen” (58. inf.).
The third chapter on the rites (59) is the one which twits the
accusers on the non-appearance of their witness. Apuleius begins
it with the two questions cited above (p. 77), “Why did you read
the deposition?” and “Where is Crassus himself?” Apuleius provides
some answers.
Did he grow tired of home and return to Alexandria? Is he home washing his walls? Or is our gourmand—as is more likely—nursing a hangover? (ex
crapula adtemptatur [59. 1]).
This last answer is supported by the fact that Crassus had been seen
in town the day before, in the company of Aemilianus, and none too
sober (“tibi, Aemiliane, obructantem” [59. 2]). He is either, Apuleius
suggests, long since drunk and snoring, or sweating oﬀ his stupor at
the baths, preparing for the drinking of dinner. Or perhaps Aemilianus, in a prudent moment, decided to keep him away, lest Claudius Maximus should see him (59. 3–5), for he is quite a sight (59. 6).
He has long since “drained his patrimony down his throat” and has
nothing left except his house, where he keeps shop as a calumnia
dealer. His most recent transaction was the best of his career, for he
sold “that intoxicated lie” for three thousand sesterces, and everyone
knows it (59. inf ).
Apuleius’ concluding chapter (60) on the matter of the nocturnal
rites is very important, for it states that Apuleius’ concern in dealing
with the charge is not establishment of innocence, but exposure and
harm for his calumnious enemies. He begins: “Omnes hoc, antequam
ﬁeret, cognovimus . . . . ” “We all knew this before it happened.” This
is tantalizing. Who are “we all”? This is not the ﬁrst person plural of
the editorial or Ciceronian type. It seems actually intended as the
plural; when Apuleius refers to himself alone, he uses the singular.
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He shifts to the singular with his very next verb:
et potui denuntiatione impedire, nisi scirem mendacium tam stultum potius Aemiliano, qui frustra redimebat, quam mihi, qui merito con-temnebam, offuturum (60. 1).
His concern is to expose and to harm his enemies, and if they wish
to help him, he will gladly let them. His motive for allowing the
testimony to be read, even when he could have prevented it, would
seem to be part of his motive for precipitating the whole trial. If so,
we should add the following explanation to his “opportunity . . . to
justify philosophy and vindicate myself,” and to his “opportunity to
extinguish publicly the defamation against me:”1
I wanted Aemilianus to be aﬄicted with the loss,
and Crassus to be prostituted by the disgrace of his
testimony (60. 1).
Apuleius knows the date, place, parties, and price of the transaction. It had taken place, he explains, the day before yesterday in the
home of Herennius Ruﬁnus. Calpurnianus was there, too; he and
Herennius pleaded with Aemilianus to make the purchase. “Ruﬁnus
did this the more willingly since he was relatively sure that much of
the cash would end up with his wife, whose inﬁdelity he conscientiously ignores” (60. 2). The matter ended, however, with the good
eﬀect desired by Apuleius: everyone, including even the accusers, at
last realized the futility of the “nocturnal rites.” “Finally, even though
they are of the most insolent audacity and importune impudence,
they saw that Crassus’ testimony smelled of empty wine bottles. They
neither read it in its entirety, nor did they put any weight on it” (60.
4). This sentence seems to imply that Tannonius looked up from the
text, saw the reception accorded his reading, and decided to change
the subject. Apuleius summarizes in this fashion:
1

Apol. 1. 3; 67. 5. Cf. also pp. 39–40 above.
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To tell the truth, I mentioned it not because I fear
the dreadfulness of feathers and the stain of soot,
especially with you as judge [te praesertim iudice] but
so that Crassus would not go unpunished for selling
smoke to that farmer Aemilianus (60. 5) .
For many delicts, exposure itself is a suitable punishment, if not the
only one allowed by law. It is signiﬁcant that Apuleius’ stated purpose in dealing with a part of the accusation is the punishment of
a calumniator. Although Apuleius does not so clearly announce his
purpose in dealing with the other points of the accusation, one may
see the purpose reﬂected in the eﬀect. In the next topic, for instance,
his joy in exposing the delinquents is clear, even though not stated.
The Mercuriole
This topic comprises one of the more eﬀective exposures of calumnia in the Apology, for it is one of the places in which Apuleius
has concrete and visible proof that his accusers are inventing vicious
lies against him. He starts by summarizing the charge. He had had a
statuette made, it was claimed, in secret, for use in “magica maleﬁcia”
(61. 2), This was in the form of a sceletus, a “shameful and horrible”
skeleton, and Apuleius was able to worship even this, to the extent
of calling it “basileus” (62. 2). The special wood of which it was made
had been very carefully, painstakingly sought out (61. 2). “I believe I
follow their every step, and, picking up the threads one by one, reweave the entire fabric of their calumnia” (61. 3) .
That the statuette had been secretly made is eﬀectively refuted
by the fact that the accusers know who made it (61. 5–6), and is denied by the artisan himself (61. 5–6). Apuleius reminds the audience
of the artisan’s testimony, which was given in answer to the questions of the proconsul himself (61. 5). Apuleius presents the whole
story of the construction of the ﬁgurine as an indirect quotation of
what the artisan has sworn:
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. . . that I, when I saw many geometric forms cleverly and
neatly done in his shop, and was pleased by his craftsmanship, asked him to do some mechanica, and, at the same
time, to do some ﬁgurine of whatever deity he should wish,
for me to worship after my custom, of any material so long
as it was wood; that he therefore had ﬁrst tried boxwood:
that my stepson Pontianus, to please me, had brought him
a coﬀer of ebony obtained from Capitolina, a most honorable lady, and urged him to make it of this more rare and
durable material, saying it would be especially pleasing to
me; that he followed these instructions, so far as the coﬀer
allowed; that he was able, from the combined thickness of
its carefully joined boards, to complete a Mercuriole. Haec
ut dico omnia audisti (61. 6–62. 1).
The son of Capitolina is present to corroborate this testimony,
saying that Pontianus obtained the ebony; Pontianus took it to the
artisan and later gave the completed Mercuriole to Apuleius as a gift
(62. 1–2). “With all these items openly and clearly established, what
is there, in which any suspicion of magic may be hiding? Nay, rather,
what is there that does not refute you in this obvious lie?” (quod vos
manifesti mendacii non revincat [62. 3]).
Apuleius next complains that they were not even ashamed to
state falsely that he had looked for the wood all over town—even
though they knew he had been away at the time. “Tertium mendacium vestrum,” Apuleius continues, was that the ﬁgurine was a ﬂeshless cadaver, dire and ghastly. “But why,” he asks, “if you had found
so evident a sign of magic, did you not subpoena me to exhibit it? So
you could lie about something absent?” Unfortunately for Aemilianus and his friends, Apuleius’ religious habits will not allow Aemilianus such a privilege. Apuleius takes a ﬁgurine of some deity with
him wherever he goes, and he has thus brought the one in question with him to Sabratha. So, sometime earlier in the day when he
heard “this impudent falsehood of the skeleton” being recited, he had
someone run back to the hotel and get it. As it is exposed and hand-
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ed to the panel of judges, Apuleius addresses his enemies: “Do you
hear the indignant outcry of the whole assemblage? Do you hear the
damnation of your falsehood? Are you not ﬁnally ashamed of each
of your calumniae? This is a skeleton? This is a ghost? Is this what
you call a demon? Is this something magic, or is it something religious and common?” (63. 6)
Apuleius asks that Claudius himself examine it, calling to his attention certain points which would make it impossible to consider it
a skeleton:
See how noble the face, how full it is of youthfulness,1 note the cheerful appearance, and how
neatly the down grows on each cheek, how the unruly hair sticks out under the sunhat, how pleasantly
little wings spread out over both temples, and how
festively his garment is thrown back around the
shoulders. The man who would dare call this a skeleton either has seen no idols of the gods or neglects
them all . . . (63. 7–9).
Thus Apuleius has caught his victims in three rather clear lies. The
ﬁgurine was not secretly made; Apuleius did not ransack the whole
town for the special wood, and, as is unexpectedly and dramatically
shown, the statue was nothing infernal, but in fact a religious one of
a very common type.
The type was so common, in fact, that—so far as Apuleius’ description goes—there is no diﬀerence between Apuleius’ Mercuriole
and the ﬁgures which Pompeiian tradesmen, in hopes that the numen would bless their enterprises with proﬁt, had had painted on
1 “Of youthfulness” translates “suci palaestrici.” The “sucus” of a human being was
the “vital sap” possessed by the young and the healthy. Its absence leaves a man dried
up, old, and shriveled. See Richard B. Onians, Origins of European Thought about the
Body, Cambridge (1951), pp. 192-212. He points out, appropriately enough, that
“skeleton” is from σκελέω, “to dry up.” That the ﬁgurine’s face is full of the “sap
of exercise” would seem to mean a boyishly full face, not the desiccated face of a
“skeleton.”
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the walls of their shops. Typically, such painted ﬁgures have small
wings spread over the temples, the sun-hat, the shaggy hair visible
underneath it, the youthful face, and the “garment festively thrown
back around the shoulders.”1 The modern accusers of Apuleius, who
ﬁnd “Hermes Trismegistus the god of magic” in the Mercuriole description do not account for the fact that all points of Apuleius’ incidental description can be matched in wall paintings of Pompeiian shops (see appendix). Mottoes in these shops, e.g., LUCRUM
GAUDIUM and SALVE LUCRUM,2 leave no doubts about the
entirely innocent nature of the worship of Mercury which these ﬁgures involved.
Apuleius’ worship of Mercury was not quite so crass. He
makes unmistakably clear in explaining why he refers to his idol as
βασιλευ ς that through it he worships the supreme deity:
For who might that “Lord” be, the original cause,
reason and origin of all nature, the greatest father of
the spirit, the eternal safeguard of living things, the
assiduous artisan of his own world, but an artisan
without labor, a safeguard without worry, a father
without propagation, conﬁned by no space, time nor
change, intelligible to few, ineﬀable to all (64. 7).
He calls this deity “Lord” on the precedent of Plato.3 Golann, one
of those who consider the “Lord” some anonymous, magical demon
whose powerful name Apuleius will not reveal, has tried to deprive
Apuleius of Plato’s support by the curious expedient of “doubt[ing]
that Plato was in the habit of calling the supreme deity basileus.”4But
what Plato says twice we cannot expect a Platonist like Apuleius to
1

For reproductions of two such wall paintings, see Amedeo Maiuri, Pompeii,
n.d., Novara, pp. 116, 132.
2

Amedeo Maiuri, op. cit., p. 114.

3

Ep. 2. 312 E and Laws 10. 904 A.

4

Golann, op. cit. p. 155.
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ignore. Apuleius’ request that his statue be made only of wood also
stems from Plato (Laws 12. 9555 E).
It is more important, however, to note that the Mercuriole when
produced inspired an indignant outcry against the accusers (see
above, p. 83), and that the sections devoted to the Mercuriole constitute a triumphant exposure of a series of malicious falsehoods.
Thus, whether discussing “magic” ﬁsh, “enchanted” patients, a
linen handkerchief, soot and feathers, or a ﬁgurine of Mercury, Apuleius’ mood is gleefully vindictive, not nervous. It appears that the arguments which are scarcely convincing are those lodged against Apuleius. He credibly presents them as inane supports for unsupportable lies, hastily collected and easily destroyed. That these arguments
were to prop the lies which had been viciously circulated against him
for two years makes it the more enjoyable for Apuleius to deal with
them so tauntingly. Far from providing any cogent reason for believing Apuleius a magician, the sections of the Apology dealing with
the accessory charges of magic give good reason to believe Apuleius when he congratulates himself for the opportunity of clearing his
name and extinguishing the defamation against him.
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C HAPTER VI

T HE C ENTRAL C RIMEN : W INNING A W IFE WITH M AGIC

I

n the second half of the oration, the aggressive and prosecuting
manner found in the ﬁrst sections grows even more remarkable.
It has been noticed by Pack, one of those who would have Apuleius
really guilty of magical practices:
In any case, when he leaves this subject [magic] and
turns to his relations with Pudentilla, we see that
there is nothing on his conscience: now, with solid
proofs at his command, he speaks forth-rightly, as if
himself the accuser. As one hapax legomenon after another comes purling so richly from his lips we realize that while ostensibly defending himself he is really achieving a most devastating excoriation of his
prosecutors. 1
This, he further notes, is done with a “merciless insistence.” Though
Pack, whose interest lay in other areas, does not develop this theme,
examination of the Apology shows his observation to be true, and
Apuleius to be a quasi accuser, a plaintiﬀ developing a charge of
calumnia.
The theme of the ﬁrst section (66) of the so-called “book two” is
that Aemilianus’ motive for the accusation was not any bona ﬁde belief that Apuleius was guilty of magic, but was simply hatred.
No other cause for this trial and for several other
earlier dangers to my life can be found except mere
hatred (66. 3).
1

Pack, op. cit. p. 79, emphasis added.
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Even if Aemilianus had discovered that Apuleius were a magician,
what could have moved him to accuse, since Apuleius had in no way
harmed him? This is a question Apuleius raises, and it is the only instance in the chapter where the possibility of good faith is broached:
“etsi vere magum me comperisset . . . . “ The point is, they had not
discovered him to be a magician, a fact which must have been evident to everyone. They had, in sum, made their accusation oﬃcial
only because they had to; they showed what kind of accusation it
was when they risked the anger of the judge by putting the accusation in the name of an infant so they would not be responsible
for it. The reader will recall that Claudius Maximus ordered them
to place the accusation in the name of an adult. Had their case been
bona ﬁde, they would have guarded their chances of victory closely:
they certainly would not have disobeyed the man who would judge
it. Or, if they had known their case to be a patent fraud, they would
care nothing of what the judge thought of their case, so long as their
safety were assured. They could with no loss disobey the judge, especially if it were a means to secure their safety from a condemnation
of calumnia. Further, when questioned by Claudius Maximus, their
own answers revealed the nugatory nature of their charges (46. 6–7).
Their failure to use the rather large number of witnesses they had
summoned was similarly revealing. Finally, as we have seen, their accessory charges of magical practices were exuberantly demolished.
And now, when Apuleius wonders out loud why they would
have done such a thing, listing the possible motives for the accusation, belief in its truth is not among them: Did they accuse for vengeance? He has done them no harm. Did they accuse to gain glory
and fame, as noble youths were once accustomed, to initiate their careers by gaining a showplace for their eloquence? No. The custom
has long since died out, and “the parading of eloquence does not beﬁt a rough illiterate, nor does desire of glory beﬁt a country barbarian, nor does a debut before the bar beﬁt a greybeard” (66. 3–6). Did
Aemilianus accuse to give proof of his own severitas or integritas out
of his disdain for maleﬁcia? Such a motive is not to be looked for in
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such a man. Apuleius says it with a pun:
At ego hoc Aemiliano, non huic Afro, sed illi Africano et Numantino et praeterea Censorio vix credidissem (66. 8).
The possibilities have been considered and rejected. By elimination
one motive remains:
What is it then? It is plainer than day [clarius die lucet] to everyone that nothing other than hatred provoked this man, his instigator Ruﬁnus—about whom
I will soon speak—and my other enemies to devise
these calumniae of magic (67. 1).
It is to be noticed that in this section Apuleius’ interest is not to
show calumnia. This has already been suﬃciently established, leaving
Apuleius now free to show that their motive for it was of the basest
sort. But Apuleius is still not satisﬁed. They had made ﬁve further
charges. Each of them is either patently falsiﬁed or pointless, and
will therefore serve to demonstrate further that their slanders and
the action which resulted from them were raised vexandi gratia.
Of these ﬁve, four were outright lies. As Apuleius lists them, the
ﬁrst was “that Pudentilla had never wished to remarry, but was compelled by my incantations” (67. 3). Pudentilla had remained a widow
fourteen years the better to rear her sons and protect their heritage,
for she had no intention of remarrying within her husband’s family, and her father-in-law had threatened to disinherit her sons if she
married outside the family. On his death, she had made it clear that
she wished to remarry. Furthermore, her health had been failing, and
remarriage was the prescribed remedy of her doctors (68–69).
Aemilianus especially approved of this, the same Aemilianus who not too long ago was swearing to that
most conﬁdent lie that Pudentilla had never given
a thought to marriage until I compelled her to it by
means of evil-doing magic . . . . I have often heard it
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said—and wisely said—that a liar should have a good
memory. But you, Aemilianus, did not recall that before I had come to Oea, you had sent a letter to her
son Pontianus, saying that she would marry (69. 4–5).
Apuleius has the very letter, and he has apparently already introduced it into evidence:
You, bring the letter . . .or better yet, give it to him?
have him read it, that with his own voice he may
correct his own words.
Aemilianus is shown the letter, but apparently balks at reading it
aloud:
Is it your letter? Why are you growing pale? Perhaps it is because you are incapable of a blush. Well,
is it your seal? [Silence. Apuleius has the letter
read.] Read it louder, please, that everyone may understand how much his tongue disagrees with his
pen, how he disagrees with himself much more than
with me! (69. 6–8).
After thus wittily and publicly embarrassing his adversary, Apuleius
points out the absurdity of Aemilianus’ position. He introduces this
part by quoting from the letter: “She ought to marry and wants to,
I know, but whom she will choose, I do not know.” He certainly did
not. Pudentilla knew his hateful malice, and would tell him nothing of the candidates, leaving him still hoping she would marry his
brother. “Therefore, if she had married Sicinius Clarus, a rustic and
decrepit old man, you would say she married willingly, without magic. But since she married a young man, and one such as you describe,
you say she did it under duress and furthermore that she was always
a scorner of marriage. You did not know that your letter was kept?
you did not know that you would be convicted by your own testimony” (70. 3-4).
With the ﬁrst charge exposed as a falsehood, Apuleius turns to
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the second, “concerning Pudentilla’s letter, which they think acknowledges magic” (67. 3). As we have seen (pp. 13–14 above), the letter of
Pudentilla had long been used by Apuleius’ enemies to discredit him.
They further appealed to this letter when forced into the courtroom
with their slanders. Claudius Maximus ordered a witnessed copy to
be made (78. 6) and with this done, Apuleius, so to speak, has them
within his power. Even though he could simply read the letter and be
done with the whole matter, he prefers to toy with them.
He begins by pretending that the letter actually contains what
they had been saying it contains. Is he a magician because Pudentilla said he was? He makes this point with a taunting reminder of
how poorly they have done so far: “With so many arguments, with
so many witnesses and even with such a speech you have not proved
me a magician: Would she prove it with one sentence? And how
much more seriously is an indictment in court to be taken than what
“is indited in a letter!”1 This last would seem to be a reference to
their accusation, for this indictment had not been taken seriously at
all. Since this was the fate of their indictment, how seriously could
they expect their letter to be taken?
‘Magum te scripsit Pudentilla: igitur magus es.’
What, then, if she had called me ‘consul’? I am a
consul? What if she had styled me ‘painter,’ or
‘M.D.,’ or ‘innocent’? Would you think any of these
if she had said it? of course not (79. 4).
He continues in the same vein, mining his accusers’ path with dilemmas and showing the absurdity of their case:
‘But she loved you madly!’ I will, for the sake of argument, grant this . . . . But it seems she did not love me,
if at that time she wrote something which would obviously be to my harm.
1

The unusual choice of words (indict, indite) is an attempt to render the pun:
Et quanto tandem gravius habendum est quod in iudicio subscribitur quam quod in
epistula scribitur—89. 2.
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Finally, would you have her sane or insane when
she wrote? ‘Sane,’ you say? Then she had suﬀered no
magic. Will you answer ‘insane’? Then she did not
know what she was talking about and is not to be trusted (79. 6–80. 1).
We must not yield to the temptation to pass oﬀ this last dilemma as
“mere sophistry.” Apuleius is simply using his wit to reveal a basic improbability in their accusation. If the magician has her so much under
his power that she cannot but say “yes” to his proposal of marriage, he
controls her will. This being the case, how is she free to say she is bewitched? Perhaps he let his spell lapse long enough for her to write
the letter? If we examine the portion of the letter which the accusers
quoted, we observe that this will not do. “Apuleius is a magician: I am
bewitched by him and I love him too much.” She was still under his
spell at the time of writing. Even the text of their criminally truncated
evidence is absurd, and there is no means of escape from the validity
of Apuleius’ reduction. Or, as Apuleius puts it:
. . . he commits absurdity, who declares that he is keeping silence . . . the act of professing denies what is professed. This is even more contradictory: “I am insane”
because it is not true unless knowingly stated: but
then the speaker is sane, for he knows what insanity is.
Therefore a person cannot know he is insane, any more
than he can see that he is blind.
Thus, if what they say is true, it is absurd. This established, Apuleius, by the simple expedient of having the letter read, proceeds to
show that their statement was false anyway. But he interrupts the
reader ﬁrst to point out that the text of Pudentilla’s letter to Pontianus corroborates his narration of the family situation. A second purpose of his interruption of the reading is to preface the most important part of the letter with the following accusation and request for
punishment:
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There remains the part of the letter which . . . was sent
for the single purpose of driving from me that charge
of magic. It is to the lasting glory of Ruﬁnus that this
letter changed to the extent that it sought to convince
the Oeenses that I am a magician . . . . What Palamedes, Sisyphus, or even a Eurybates or a Phrynondas
could have conceived such a thing? All whom I named,
though renowned for fraud, would, if compared with
this one deceit of Ruﬁnus, appear clowns and bunglers.
How marvelously contrived! How subtle! How worthy
of prison and dungeon! (81. 1–5).
After quoting the “damning” passage in its context to show that
its meaning has been fraudulently perverted, Apuleius again raises the matter of punishment: “Your arts are exposed, Ruﬁnus, your
frauds are in the open, your lie is found. Truth once tripped arises, and calumnia, so to speak, falls to the bottom of the barathron”1
(83. inf.).
The third point listed by Apuleius is likewise a falsiﬁcation:
“deinde sexagesimo anno aetatis ad lubidinem nupsisse” (67. 3).
Like the rest of this lying, calumnious accusation, this falsehood,
too, Apuleius insists, deserves punishment. Its point was apparently to demonstrate that Apuleius’ sole interest in the marriage was ﬁnancial gain. But her father, following the prescribed custom, had
ﬁlled out a statement of her birth in duplicate, one copy for the public archive, another for keeping at home. The “birth certiﬁcate” was
recorded on tablets tied together with linen cord; sealing wax had
been poured over the cord, and on this, her father had placed his seal
(89. 2). The certiﬁcate is produced, and it shows that Pudentilla is
not yet forty (89. 5). Here is Apuleius’ comment: “O falsum audax
et nimium, o mendacium viginti annorum exsilio puniendum!” (89.
6). Even though the twenty-year exile is suggested by the twentyyear lie, and is rather clearly a witticism, the fact remains that it was
1

The name of a cliﬀ in Athens, the barathron was also a means of punishment:
the condemned were thrown over its edge.
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“falsum audax et nimium” and therefore “puniendum.” But if this is
a joke, there is a vicious sting to its point, for by this time, custom
had added new risks for the calumniator. The judge could, at his own
discretion, add to the legally-prescribed penalty, infamia. Apuleius’
contemporary Gaius records that the malicious prosecutor “extra ordinem damnatur, id est exilium aut relegationem aut ordinis amotionem patiatur” (Dig. 47.10.43).1 Thus exile, the penalty Apuleius
says Aemilianus has merited, is actually the penalty which at that
time was deemed appropriate for a maliciously false accusation. Although Apuleius could not hope to have the penalty imposed, since
the accusation which deserved it was entered in the name of an infant, he does seem to have used the current penalty for calumnia as
a barb in his punning remark “mendacium viginti annorum exsilio
puniendum.”
Alone of the ﬁve, the fourth point, “et quod in villa ac non in
oppido tabulae nuptiales sint consignatae” (67. 3), is true, but it is
also pointless and provides further ammunition for Apuleius’ attack.
He deals with it brieﬂy and acidly. Apuleius and Pudentilla had determined upon a marriage in the country “so the citizens would not
again ﬂy in for free dinners.”2 Pudentilla’s expenses for public largesse on the day of Pontianus’ wedding had come to ﬁfty thousand
sesterces, and a repetition would not have been welcome. Further,
they wished to avoid “the several banquets and nuisances which are
all but de rigueur for newlyweds.”
You have, Aemilianus, the whole reason why the
marriage took place not in town, but in a country
villa: to avoid the necessity of again throwing away
ﬁfty thousand sesterces and to avoid dining in your
presence or in your home. Is this reason enough?
(88. 1)
The last of the ﬁve was by far the worst, as Apuleius makes clear:
1

Cf. J. L. Strachan-Davidson, op. cit. vol. 2, p. 138.

2 “ne

cives denuo ad sportulas convolarent,” 87. 10.
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“novissima et eadem invidiosissima criminatio de dote fuit” (67. 4).
They had been especially insistent on this point. “Here they struggled with all their strength and poured out all their venom? here
they were most anguished, saying that I, at the start of the union,
in the country far from all witnesses, extorted an oversize dowry
from this woman in love.” At the end of this list of ﬁve points, Apuleius promises the treatment which we have, in large part, already
witnessed:

2). It was not an outright gift, but was more in the nature of a promise.1 Should Pudentilla bear Apuleius no surviving children, the
sum would revert to the oﬀspring of her ﬁrst marriage. Otherwise,
it would be halved between the oﬀspring of Sicinius Amicus and of
Apuleius (91. 8).
This established, Apuleius proceeds to put his enemies to shame
for their lying and their audacity. To Aemilianus he says, “take the
contract in your own hands, give it to your instigator Ruﬁnus; let
him read it, let him feel shame for his swollen spirit and his ambitious lying” (92. 2). Their boldness is thoroughly underscored in the
following passage:
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I will show each of these to be so false, inane and full
of nothing so easily and unanswerably, that I am actually afraid, Maximus, and you, his advisors, that you
might suppose I have brought in and suborned an accuser, so that, with the opportunity [occasione] oﬀered,
I might extinguish the defamation leveled against me
(67. 5).
Thus, in his repetition of his charge that the accusation is calumnious, he repeats the statement of the introduction (‘copia et facultas,’ [1. 3]) and enlarges upon it. It is now so obvious to everyone
that the accusation was to Apuleius’ advantage that Apuleius now
fears charges of collusion. His blundering enemies, by publicly offering insults and then being obliged to turn their slanders into
an oﬃcial accusation, have obligingly spared Apuleius the expense
of hiring an accuser to give him the chance to clear his name. He
explains:
You may believe me, for I speak what is self-explanatory: I should convince you, lest you deem so frivolous an
accusation rather cleverly thought out by me than stupidly undertaken by them (67. 6).
As for the ﬁnal charge of extorting a dowry grandis et uber, it receives as unchallengeable an answer as anything in the Apology. Apuleius produces the table of the marriage contract, in which it is
found that the dowry was three hundred thousand sesterces (92. 1–

95

And who is there, even if he is only slightly experienced in aﬀairs, who would dare ﬁnd guilt, if a
once-married woman of moderate appearance and
age should tempt a young man, sound of body, character and fortune, with a large dowry and with good
terms? (92. 5)
Not only is this established practice, but Pudentilla would have had
to do it, “had she not found a philosopher who scorns dowries” (92.
11).
Among the last ﬁve points dealt with by Apuleius, there are two
lesser ones which further show the calumnious nature of the accusation. The ﬁrst is a forged letter: “Fuit et ilia commenticia epistula
neque mea manu scripta neque verisimiliter conﬁcta” (87. 2). As for
the ﬁrst point of his description, Apuleius has perhaps oﬀered countering samples of his own handwriting. Fortunately, Apuleius explains his second point more fully, and with his customary wit: “qua
[epistula] videri volebant blanditiis a me mulierem sollicitatam. Cur
1

We cannot be certain of the exact nature of the dowry, for a key word seems
to have dropped out of our text: “modicam dotem neque eam datam, sed tantummodo . . . ” (91. 7). Textual critics have supplied “commodatam” (Purser), “creditam”
(Helm), and “dictam” (Norden). The last seems best. Cf. 102. 1: “uti dotem mihi . . .
diceret.”
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ego blandirem, si magia conﬁdebam?” (87. 2) He puts several questions to his accusers about the credibility of their letters: “Why was
the letter written in such low [“vitiosis verbis”], barbaric Greek, if it
was written by the man whom they say is skilled in that language?
(87. 4) Why would the man whom they say knows well enough how
to write amatory verses try to ingratiate himself with the grotesque
language of the taverns?” (“absurdis tabernariis blanditiis” [87. 4]).
Such a letter as this would oblige a man to send it by the most trustworthy carrier he could ﬁnd. So how did they get it? (87.3) The answer is clear to anyone: “The person who could not read Pudentilla’s
letter, though it was in the best Greek, could easily and suitably esteem this letter as his own” (87. 5).
The second of these unlisted charges is the last one dealt with in
the speech, and seems something of an afterthought. They charged
that he had purchased, in his own name, a “beautiful estate” for a
huge sum of Pudentilla’s money. Like several other matters, this
seems an outright lie. Corvinus Celer, vir ornatus, quaestor, had sold
the land, and Cassius Longinus, acting as Pudentilla’s tutor auctor,
had authorized the transaction. Both are present to support Apuleius’ statement that Pudentilla purchased the property for sixty thousand sesterces, and in her own name.

CONCLUSION

I

t is now perhaps clear that the trio of accusers committed a rather
gross criminal calumnia, and that Apuleius’ interest in the Apology
was as much to establish their guilt as to disprove his own. To support the main charge that Apuleius had won Pudentilla by means
of magic, the accusers were obliged to resort to no less than ﬁfteen
falsehoods:
1. That Apuleius had the well-kept hair of a gigolo (4. 12)
2. That he arrived with one slave or freed three in one day (17)
3. That he used virile and feminale ﬁsh for a philtre (33)
4. That he enchanted a boy (42)
5. That they would provide other boys “likewise enchanted by
Apuleius” (42)
6. That he enchanted a woman (47)
7. That the unknown items in the handkerchief were magical
(53)
8. That he habitually performed nocturnal rites (i.e., the testimony of Crassus [57])
9. That he worshipped a skeleton, calling it “Basileus” (61)
10. That Pudentilla had never wished to remarry (67)
11. That Pudentilla herself wrote that Apuleius was a magus
(67)
12. That Pudentilla was 60 years old when they married (67)
13. That Pudentilla was forced by magic to grant a huge dowry
(67)
14. That Apuleius wrote an unsavory letter to Pudentilla (87)
and
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15. That Apuleius used much of Pudentilla’s funds to buy himself a large estate.
The ﬁrst we may forgive the accusers. The others are more grave.
The second (that Apuleius came to Oea accompanied by a single slave) is necessarily false if, while staying in Oea, he shortly after freed three in one day. The alternative to counting this a lie is to
count Apuleius guilty of chicanery. Even if Apuleius were not an
honest man (I assume throughout that he is) , the fact that Claudius
Maximus had heard the speech he refers to would necessarily have
deterred him from misrepresenting it.
The third, that Apuleius used obscene ﬁsh for a love potion, is
one charge which several would have true. But if one would have
Apuleius a practitioner of sympathetic magic, one must somehow
account for chapters thirty-four and thirty-ﬁve—it seems beyond
credence that the man who can laugh at such stupidity should have
tried it himself.
The fourth and ﬁfth go together (Apuleius enchanted a boy; the
accusers will produce other boys also enchanted by Apuleius). If the
fourth is not a lie, the ﬁfth would never have arisen. And if the ﬁfth
is true, where are the enchanted boys? The sixth is no more likely
than the ﬁfth (why shouldn’t an epileptic fall?). The seventh is rather clear: if one does not know what is in a handkerchief, one cannot
honestly state that the contents are magical.
The eighth, the deposition of Crassus, may safely be taken for a
falsehood. The judge, the accused and the accusers all had the precedent of Hadrian upon which to distrust the testimony of absent
witnesses.
The ninth, the “hideous skeleton” Apuleius is supposed to have
worshipped, is safely counted a lie. All critics save one1 are convinced
that the ﬁgurine in question is a Mercury, not a sceletus. The tenth
through the thirteenth, which formed the basis of the entire case
against Apuleius, were proved lies by incontrovertible documentary
1 L. Herrmann sees a cruciﬁx in the “sceleti forma turpe et horribile.” “La Procès
d’Apulée,” op. cit., p. 334.
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evidence, as was the ﬁteenth. As for the fourteenth, the forged letter,
to call it genuine is to ascribe to Apuleius the language of a barkeeper (tabernarius). The accusation, then, was a fabric of ﬁfteen hardy
lies, in sum, calumnia.
Could the accusers have entered such an accusation as this willingly? No. Therefore, the standard assumption, that the accusers accused intentionally, leads to the opinion that Apuleius falsiﬁes the
accusation and that it was not at all as Apuleius represents it. But if
one credits Apuleius— as we have good reason to do—one ﬁnds evidence that Apuleius’ enemies accused much against their will, and
that “the Trial of Apuleius” can be accounted for by something like
the following:
Brieﬂy, the accusers of Apuleius came to the forum of Sabratha
with only the intent to embarrass Apuleius in public once again. But
their publicly shouted insults constituted an act liable to punishment,
iniuria atrox, and this time it was committed in front of a judge. Apuleius, aﬀ ronted much less by the interruption of his speech than
by the slanders with which he was interrupted, challenged his tormentors to defend the truth of their charges in an oﬃcial accusation or face liability for the publicly oﬀered insults. The judge supported him. The hecklers were obliged to accuse. The calumnia which
this involved did not disturb them, as they were able to evade liability for this crime by placing the accusation in the name of a teammate who happened still to be an infant before the law. Apuleius,
far from “nervous,” considers this trial which he has precipitated an
opportunity (copia, facultas, occasio) to end the defamation mounted against him and to restore his good name. As the calumniatores
have protected themselves against prosecution and punishment for
their crime, Apuleius also used his speech to accuse, prosecute, and
punish. Though he suggests several penalties which they deserved,
none could be applied, since an infant accused. He therefore ruthlessly meted out the penalty of external exposure.

Appendix

A PPENDIX

T HE M ERCURIOLE AS AN A RGUMENT FOR A PULEIUS’
G UILT OF M AGICAL P RACTICES

As has been noted in the introduction to the present dissertation
(above, pp. 6–7), the Mercuriole forms the strongest argument for
Apuleius’ modern accusers. But even this argument, however, has
short-comings. The fact that Apuleius worships a Mercury is seen
as “highly convincing with regard to Apuleius’ possible practice of
magic”1 for two reasons. First, Mercury is a god of magic: “Denn
dass Merkur Zaubergott ist Apuleius selbst hat uns gesagt, er nennt
ihn unter den in Kap. 31 aufgezahlten Zaubergottheiten an erster
Stelle.”2 Golann remarks that “possession of a statue of Mercury
might ordinarily have been an incriminating admission.”3 Second,
the particular Mercury worshipped is really Hermes Trismegistus,
the god and founder of magic:
But here, as elsewhere, Apuleius unguardedly tips his
hand, for Norden, following Abt, has shown that the
“Mercury” was really a Hermes—Hermes Trismegistus, the very patron of magicians; characteristic was
his chlamys (63. 26f.: quam autem festive circa humeros
vestis substricta sit) and signiﬁcant the fact that ebony,
a magic wood, was chosen. It seems undeniable that
he had actually dabbled to some extent in the black
arts.4

That Hermes Trismegistus is the founder of magic is seen especially in a papyrus, cited by Vallette and Norden, which calls Hermes π
α′ντων μα′γων α’ ρχηγενη′ς.1 Abt, Norden, and Pack identify the little statuette as a Hermes Trismegistus on the basis of the fact that
Hermes in the “magical hymns” is often addressed as Χλαμυδηφο′ρε,
and the “cloth festively thrown around the shoulders” of the statuette is seen as a χλαμυ′ς, making Apuleius’ Mercuriole a Hermes
Chlamydephoros.2 But as we have seen above (pp. 83–84), the Mercuriole as described by Apuleius distinctly matches wall paintings of
Mercury commissioned by Pompeiian tradesmen. We note also that
the vestis circa humeros substricta is literally represented in the Pompeiian paintings. No one has accused the Pompeiian tradesmen of
magic.
It is also regarded as suspicious that Apuleius worships the god
as βασιλευ′ς. Golann points out that Trismegistus was addressed
this way.3 Abt states concerning the title βασιλευ′ς: “Wir können die Erklärung des Apuleius ganz aus dem Spiel lassen.4 Wir
mussen hier fragen, was die Gegner mit der Angabe dieses Names
Schlimmes aussagen wollten.”5 He then notes that Melech was
styled basileus, as was Hades in the papyri.6 But in his attempt to
ﬁnd something incriminating in the name basileus, Abt, perhaps in
keeping with his denial of the relevance of Apuleius, ignores Apology 61. 1, where the word basileus ﬁrst appears: “. . . quod me aiunt
. . . cum sit sceleti forma turpe et horribile, tamen impendio colere
et Graeco vocabulo βασιλε′ α nuncupare.” Clearly, was Schlimmes in
1

Vallette, L’Apologie, p. 312; Norden, Apuleius und das Römische Privatrecht,
p. 44.
2 This magical signiﬁcance of the chlamys is noted in Abt, op. cit., p. 228; in Norden, op. cit., p. 45, and Pack, op. cit., p. 78.

1

C. P. Golann, The Life of Apuleius, p. 153.

3

2

Adam Abt, Apologia und Zauberei, p. 233.

4

3

Golann, op. cit., p. 154.

4

Pack, “Adventures of a Dilettante,” p. 78.
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Golann, op. cit., p. 154.

This cavalier attitude toward the evidence of the Apology is typical of Apuleius’
modern accusers.
5

Abt, op. cit., p. 225.

6

Ibid.
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the accusation was simply that Apuleius worshipped this monstrous
skeleton assiduously despite its gruesomeness: “. . . which they say .
. . I worship zealously and call ‘Lord’ in Greek, even though it is a
disgraceful and frightful skeleton.” Calling a skeleton “Lord” would
have been a clear sign of magic, for praying to impious gods seems
to have been speciﬁcally proscribed.1 If Apuleius called a skeleton
“Lord,” it would have indicated he worshipped it devotedly. Addressing a divinity by a title instead of by proper name was a token
of religious awe of long standing. Homer had often called various of
’′ναξ, πο′τνια), and had comthe Olympian gods “Lord” or “Lady” ( α
monly had his characters address them respectfully by a title rather
than by a proper name.2 Presumably, the accusers of Apuleius, by
saying he called the skeleton basileus, simply wished to indicate the
extent to which he worshipped it. But Apuleius’ idol was not some
horrible goblin, but an Olympian god who could properly be addressed by some such title as basileus.
It is also seen as an indication of magic that Apuleius makes a
point of keeping his basileus anonymous—an indication that the true
name had magical powers which the orator does not want to lose.3
But if others used ﬁgurines of Mercury for magic, this is no indication that Apuleius did: we cannot make Apuleius responsible for
the acts of anonymous authors of papyrus texts. If person X uses his
ﬁgurine—and his edulia and his earth, air, ﬁre, and water—for magic, this tells us nothing about what Apuleius uses his for. And if it
were really incriminating to admit to Mercuriolatry, Apuleius would
not have been such a blunderer as to “tip his hand” twice about Mercury as a god of magic (31. 9 and 42. 6).
Apuleius’ syncretism, his extreme readiness to assimilate one god
to another, points to a religious, rather than to a magical, signiﬁcance
in the Mercuriole which he worships as basileus. We must recall that
1

Servilia, accused of magica sacra, speciﬁcally denies invoking impii dei—Tac.
Ann. 16. 31.
2

E.g., Il. 1. 1, 36, 37, 75, 110, 202, 310, 451, 528, 529, 551, 552.

3

Norden, op. cit., pp. 44–45.
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Apuleius had commissioned (and the craftsman swore to the fact
that he had commissioned) a statue of any god (61. 6). This indicates
that it did not matter to Apuleius which god was represented, that
Apuleius would have treated the representation the same way, and
called it by the same title, regardless of its identity: it is Apuleius’
habit always to take with him “a statue of some god” (63. 3). These
two statements are entirely consistent with Apuleius’ syncretism, a
consistency which should have made these two statements diﬃcult
to disregard. Apuleius is an initiate in several cults or mysteries, and
very proud of this fact: “Sacrorum pleraque initia in Graecia participavi” (55. 8). One which he gives by name is the mystery of Dionysus (Ibid.). He enlarges upon his initiations in this manner: “At ego,
ut dixi, multiiuga sacra et plurimos ritus et varias cerimonias studio veri et oﬃcio erga deos didici” (55. 9). A further measure of his
pride in his widespread faith and religious participation is that he
had noted it three years before the trial, and had even listed the various initiations:
nec hoc ad tempus compono, sed abhinc ferme triennium est, cum primis diebus Oeam veneram publice disserens de Aesculapii maiestate eadem ista
prae me tuli et quot sacra riossem percensui (55. 10).
There is further evidence of this religious syncretism outside the
Apology. In the de Deo Socratis, for instance, Apuleius equates Amphiaraus, Osiris, and Mopsus; Pessinuntia, Cecropian Artemis, and
Isis (15). A notice more signiﬁcant and pertinent is to be found in
his de Mundo, where Jupiter is acknowledged as “deorum rex omnium et pater,” and, in Greek, Ζεὺς βαςιλεὺς. Ζεὺς α’ρχὸς α‛ πα′ντων
α’ρχικε′ραυνος (37), which may serve as a comment upon the
βασιλευ′ς of the Apology: . . . Basileus totius rerum naturae causa et
ratio et origo initialis, summus animi genitor . . . (64. 7). The basileus of the de Mundo and the basileus of the Apology are apparently
the same: the one is the “origin of all things,” the other is the “initial
cause, reason, and origin of all things of nature.” Beyond the degree
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of conciseness or prolixity, there is no real diﬀerence between the
two. The “Basileus Zeus archos hapanton” also corresponds well with
` τὸν
Apuleius’ identiﬁcation of the basileus on the basis of Plato: περι
’
’
‛
πα′ντων βασιλε′ α πα′ντ′εστι` κα`ι εκε′ι νου ε′ νεκα πα′ντα (Apol. 64. 5–
6; Ep. 2 312 E). The “Zeus basileus” from the de Mundo is at least an
indication that Apuleius was consistent about calling the supreme
deity “Lord.”
It is possible that this particular manifestation of Deity which
Apuleius happens to worship through his idol of Mercury was revealed to him in an initiation. His god is “paucis cogitabilis, nemini effabilis,” “known to few, speakable to none” (64. 7). This knowledge of
God by few is curiously consistent with both Hermeticism and Plato.
According to the major document on Hermeticism, the Poimandres,
’′ρρητον εν
’
Hermes’ “name is secret and unspeakable among men” (α
’ανθρω′ποις) (1.2, p. 15, Reitzenstein). The pertinent passage of Plato
is cited by Apuleius himself in his de Platone et eius Dogmate:
’′
’
′innumerabilem et, ut ait ipse αρρητον
, ακατωνο
μαστον, cuius naturarn invenire diﬃcile est, si inventam sit, in multos iam enuntiare non posse. Platonis haec verba sunt θεὸν ευ‛ρει̃ ν τε ’′εργον, ευ‛ρο′ντα
’ ′ ρειν αδυ
’ ′ νατον (de Platone 1. 5;
δὲ εὶς ολλοὺς εκφε
Timaeus 28 C).

The proper name of God—or God himself--is known to the initiates, or to those who have taken the trouble to know Him. This is a
secret that they are bound to keep, or are incapable of divulging. In
the light of these possibilities, Apuleius’ famous refusal to identify
his “Lord” can be better understood. The refusal immediately follows
his description of the god in question, which ends with the words “...
not comprehended in space, in time or in any way, and therefore intelligible to few, speakable to no one.”

The liberal Claudius Maximus was not about to ask, and if it is a
question of initiation, it would have been an impiety for Apuleius to tell. In this case, this proudly announced reticence would be
a boast of yet another mystery in Apuleius’ list, and a boast that he
will not commit the impiety of divulging the religious secret. Or, if
he was thinking here of Plato’s Timaeus (which he has cited earlier
and feels sure Claudius Maximus has read—Apol. 48. 12 - 49. 1), he
is simply attempting to delight those who know what he is talking
about, and to tease and mystify his accusers, who certainly do not.
Either or both of these alternatives could apply; neither would rule
out the other.
Even if Apuleius was a worshipper of Hermes Trismegistus,
~ν ου’ ρανω
~ν καὶ τη
~ς υ̧η
~ς καὶ α′ντων τω
~ν ε’ ν αυ’ τοι~ς
‛ὸ βασιλευ′ων τω
1
ε’ ν διατριβο′ντων, even, as is suggested above, an initiate, does this

mean that he is a magician? No. Despite various papyri, there was
more to both Mercury and Hermes than magic. Hermes as Trismegistus may have had a cult ﬂourishing in Rome before the end
of the ﬁrst century a.d. Further, to say that “possession of a statue
of Mercury might ordinarily have been . . . incriminating” (emphasis added) is to ignore a remarkably large body of evidence in favor
of an incredibly small one. For even when one considers Trismegistus, magic was but a small portion of the god’s domain. “Hermes
Trismegistus the god and founder of magic”? One must add “of literature, poetry, medicine, algebra, geometry, astronomy, draughts,
and dice.” It is, in fact, possible to write an excellent general essay
on Hermes Trismegistus without once using the word “magic.” St.
George Stock has done it.3
When considered in its context of Apuleius’ religiosity, the Mercuriole hardly seems suspicious. But the essential diﬀerence between
religion and magic is seldom observed by Apuleius’ modern accus1

En ultro augeo magiae suspicionem; non respondeo
tibi, Aemiliane, quern colam βασιλε′α quin si ipse
proconsul interroget quid sit deus meus, taceo (54. 8).
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Richard Reitzenstein, ed. Poimandres, Leipzig, 1904, p. 17.

2

Mart. 5. 24. Cf. also R. Reitzenstein, Hellenistischen Mysterienreligionen, p. 11,
where he looks upon the line “Hermes omnia solus et ter unus” in the same way.
3

St. George Stock, Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics s.v. “Hermes Trismegistus.”
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ers, who often assimilate the one to the other. Vallette, for instance,
takes as signiﬁcant of magic a sentence from Reitzenstein’s edition
of the Poimandres which Richard Reitzenstein himself had taken as
a statement of a goal of the cult.1 Similarly, A. J. Festugière cites
Apuleius’ worship of Mercury as evidence of piety: “Now we know
that Apuleius was pious; he speaks in the Apology of a statuette of
Hermes [sic] to which he addressed his prayers . . . .”2 One must
be very circumspect before naming someone else’s religion “magic.”
The church father Athanasius was himself falsely accused of magic.
His enemies, conspiring together, arranged that one of their number
should go into hiding. The others accused Athanasius of murdering the fellow and dismembering the corpse for magic. Fortunately,
Athanasius’ followers managed to ﬁnd the “victim” and present him
to the court.3 No one supposes that Athanasius had ever practiced
magic in any way. But what if Julian had conquered instead of the
Galilean? Might we not see suspicions about Athanasius’ possible
practice of magic? Though Athanasius was without doubt innocent
of the central charge of magic, it may be signiﬁcant that the recondite god he worshipped is recorded to have changed water into wine,
and even on one occasion to have raised the dead. Is this not comparable to what is suspected of Apuleius for his worship of the supreme deity through his ﬁgurine of Mercury? Every era has oﬀered
to its people spiritual assistance, for the people to accept and enjoy,
or to reject. If Apuleius worships the origin and cause of all nature
in his Mercuriole or in Hermes Trismegistus, it is an indication that
he accepted a spiritual aid which his era oﬀered him, and not an indication that he attempted to perform magic.
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’´
και` νοη
Poim., 1. 3.
A. J. Festugière, Personal Religion among the Greeks, Berkeley, 1960, p. 76.

3 This

is related in Athan. Apo1. 63; Socrates (the Church historian) 1. 27; Soz.
2. 25, and Theod. 1. 30.

107

108

A POLOG Y as Prosecution

Girard, Paul F., Manual Elementaire de Droit Romain, ﬁfth ed., Paris,
1911.
Golann, Cecil Paige, The Life of Apuleius arid his Connection with
Magic, Princeton, 1951.
Griset, Emanuele, “Un Cristiano di Sabratha,” Rivista di Studi Classici, 5 (1957), 35–39.
Guénin, Louis P. and Eugene, L’Histoire de la Sténographie dans
l’antiquité et aux moyen age. Paris, 1908.
Guey, Julien, “L’Apologie d’Apulée et les Inscriptions de Tripolitaine,” Revue des Êtudes Latines, 32 (1954) , 115–119.
——— “Lepcitana Septimiana VI,” Revue Africaine, 96 (1952)
25–63.
——— “Lollianus Avitus et la date de l’Apologie d’Apulée,” Revue
des Êtudes Latines, 29 (1951), 307–317.
Guimet, E., “Le Dieu d’Apulée,” Revue de l’Histoire des Religions, 32
(1895), 242.
Haight, Elizabeth H., Apuleius and his Inﬂuence, New York, 1927.
Hammer, S., “L’Êtat Actuel des Recherches sur l’oeuvre d’Apulée,”
Eos, 1926, 233–245.
Helm, R., Apulei pro se de Magia Liber, Berlin, 1905 (and Leipzig,
1959).
Herrmann, Leon, “Le procès d’Apulée, fut-il un procès de Christianisme?” Revue de l’Université Libre de Bruxelles, n.s. 4 (1951–
1952), 329-337.
——— “Le Dieu-Roi d’Apulée,” Latomus 18 (1959), 110–116.

Bibliography

109

Lehnert, Georg, “Bericht über die Literatur zu Apuleius und zur
Historia Apollonii aus dem Jahren 1897–1914,” Jahrsbericht,
Bd. 171, 146–147, Bd. 175, 1–75.
LeJay, Paul, “L’Apologie d’Apulée, par Paul Vallette,” Revue Critique de
l’Histoire et de Litterature, 2 (1909), 315–319.
Maiuri, Amedeo, Pompeii, Novara, n.d.
Marquard, Joachim, Das Privatleben der Römer, Hirzel, 1886.
Mommsen, Theodor, Römisches Strafrecht, Leipzig, 1899.
Norden, Fritz, Apuleius von Madaura und das Römische Privatrecht,
Leipzig, 1912.
——— “Le Droit dans Apulée,” Revue de l’Uriiversité Libre de Bruxelles, 16 (1909), 445–483.
Oldfather, W. A., H. V. Canter, and B. E. Perry, Index Apuleianus,
Middleton, Conn., 1934.
Onians, Richard B., The Origins of European Thought about the Body,
the Mind, the Soul, the World, Time, and Fate, Cambridge,1951.
Pack, Roger A., “Adventures of a Dilettante in a Provincial Family,”
Classical Journal, 35 (1939), 67–80.
Poste, Edward, Gai Institutiones, Oxford, 1904.
Reitzenstein, Richard, Hellenistische Mysterienreligionen, “Fotomechanischer Nachdruck,” Stuttgart, 1956.
——— Poimandres, Leipzig, 1904.
Robertson, D. S., “Bibliographical Report on Apuleius,” The Year’s
Work in Classical Studies, 31 (1938), 94–96.

Kelly, J. M., Roman Litigation, Oxford, 1966.

Salottolo, E., “La Prosa di Apuleio nel de Magia,” Annali della Facolta
di Lettere e Filosoﬁa della Universita di Napoli, 1 (1957), 45–54.

Krueger, Gustave, L. Apulei Madaurensis Apologia sive de Magia Liber,
Berlin, 1864.

Schultz, Fritz, Classical Roman Law, Oxford, 1961.

110

A POLOG Y as Prosecution

Settle, J. N., “The Trial of Milo and the Other Pro Milone,” Transactions of the American Philological Association’, 94 (1963),
268–280.
Sinko, Th., “Apuleiana,” Eos, 18 (1912), 137–167.
Strachan-Davidson, J. L., Problems of the Roman Criminal Law, two
vols., Oxford, 1912.
Syme, Sir Ronald, “Proconsuls d’Afrique sous Antonin le Pieux,”
Revue des Êtudes Anciennes, 61 (1959), 310–319.
Ussani, V., “Magia, Misticismo e Arte nel Apuleio,” Nova Antologia
die Scienza, Lettere ed Arti, (March 16, 1929), 137–155.
Vallette, Paul, L’Apologie d’Apulée, Paris, 1908.
-—— Apulee: Apologie, Florides, Paris, 1924 and 1960.
Van der Vliet, S. L., Apulei Madaurensis Apologia sive de Magia Liber
et Florida, Paris, 1900.
Weinberger, “Kurzschrift,”
Altertumswissenschaft.

Real-Encyclopädie

der

classischen

Wenger, Leopold, Otis H. Fisk, tr., Institutes of the Roman Criminal
Procedure, New York, 1940.
Willcock, M. M., “Mythological Paradeigma in the Iliad,” Classical
Quarterly, 14 (1964) 141.
Wolf, Ernest, s.v., “insimulo,” Thesaurus Latinae Linguae.
De Zulueta, Francis, The Institutes of Gaius, Oxford, 1946.

